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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite years of legislative efforts there has developed no simple,
clear answer to the question: "Who owns the water in North Da-
kota?" From a legal viewpoint it is clearly inaccurate to simply
answer: "The public." A variety of ownership and use interests
have arisen and can arise in private individuals. Furthermore, North
Dakota Indian tribes and the federal government are claiming vari-
ous rights in waters within the state at the present time. However,
no cataloging or extensive analysis of all of these interests has
been attempted to date.
Before effective regulation and resource use planning can take
place, it is imperative to know who has what rights in the resource
and to what extent future rights can arise therein. Certainly, no
fully effective management can take place without a clear deline-
ation of what these interests are and under what circumstances
they may arise. The recent pressures for energy resource develop-
ment, including North Dakota's lignite coal, have spurred the need
for resource planning. Energy development requires a significant
amount of water, and it is necessary to have a comprehensive
plan in mind to meet such heavy demands.
This article deals with the entire range of legal problems relat-
ing to identification of rights in the water within North Dakota,
and its objective is to shed as much light on these rights as is
practicable. For that reason, the article is fairly extensive and
a table of contents has been prepared to facilitate use of the material.
There is, of course, an interrelationship among the delineated cate-
gories; they indicate primary focus rather than an absolute segre-
gation. Such categories necessitate some repetition of material, but
this has been kept to the absolute minimum.
The article includes an analysis of North Dakota statutes, ad-
ministrative practices, and judicial decisions. Since North Dakota
courts have not had occasion to decide many of the issues dealing
with water rights it has been necessary to consult court decisions
in other jurisdictions to indicate possible guidelines along which
North Dakota law might develop.
II. PRIVATE RIGHTS
The North Dakota Century Code declares that all waters in
the state save for two exceptions belong to the "public" and are
subject to appropriation for beneficial use." The exceptions are
(1) diffused surface waters in contributing drainage areas and (2)
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
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privately owned waters. Diffused surface waters are waters on the
surface that are not the waters of a natural stream, lake, or pond
and are such as diffuse themselves over the surface of the ground,
following no definite course or channel.2 These waters are not
excepted from public ownership in noncontributing drainage areas,
which are defined by statute as those areas that do not contribute
natural flowing surface water to a natural stream or watercourse
at an average frequence more often than once in three years over
the most recent thirty year period.3 Privately owned waters "would
seem to be water which has been physically separated from its
natural condition so as to become personal property, i.e., water
held in private tanks, basins, or receptacles in which there is no
flow or drainage in the natural manner.
' 4
From early territorial days it was, clear that water rights in
North Dakota were governed by common law and riparian doctrine
principles.2 These principles conferred sole ownership of certain
groundwaters on surface landowners and equal rights to the use
of surface waters and other groundwaters on those persons who
owned land that bounded such water. Thus, in order to effectively
determine the scope of private interests in North Dakota water,
an examination must be made of common law and riparian rights
to see whether any still exist, as well as of the appropriation doctrine
to determine to what extent private rights may be acquired pursuant
to it. Finally, a consideration must be made as to whether water
rights can be acquired by prescription.
A. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS
The common law and riparian rights doctrines in North Dakota
date back to territorial days. In 1866 the Territorial Legislature
adopted a statute that declared the following:
The owner of land owns water standing thereon, or flowing
over or under its surface, but not forming a definite stream.
Water running in a definite stream formed by nature over
or under the surface may be used by him as long as it re-
mains there; but he may not prevent the natural flow of the
stream or of the natural spring from which it commences
its definite course, nor pursue nor pollute the same.6
2. Diffused surface waters usually are discussed in the context of drainage laws. This
has already been done in North Dakota in Beck & Bohlman, Drainage Law in North Da-
kota: An Overview, 47 N.D.L. REV. 471, 472-79 (1971), and it will not be repeated herein.
See generally, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 450.5 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01(4) (1960).
4. Larson, A Local View: The Development of Water Rights and Suggested Improve-
ments in the Water Law of North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. REv. 243, 263 (1962).
5. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 infra.
6. TERR. DAK. Civ. CODE § 256 (1866).
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This law came into the North Dakota Code at statehood and remained
there until repealed 'in 1963. 7 It appeared to express the doctrine
of absolute ownership of subterranean percolating waters and diffused
surface waters. Water running in a definite stream, however, whether
over or under the ground, was subject to the doctrine of riparian
rights, a usufructuary rather than an absolute ownership concept.
Riparian rights have been enumerated as follows:
First. The right to be and remain a riparian proprietor and
to enjoy the natural advantages thereby conferred upon the
land by its adjacency to the water.
Second. The right of access to the water, including a right
of way to and from the navigable part.
Third. The right to build a pier or wharf out to navigable
water, subject to any regulations of the state.
Fourth. The right to accretions or alluvium.
Fifth. The right to make a reasonable use of the water as
it flows past or leaves the land."
It can be seen that a change to the appropriation system would
directly affect only the item "fifth" in the above enumeration. Thus
while North Dakota may no longer follow the riparian approach
to use of water, it does not necessarily follow that the other riparian
rights have also disappeared. In fact, we know that "the right
to accretions or alluvium" clearly exists in North Dakota.9 In
this article, however, the concern is with the water itself and the
use of it.
The substance of the riparian rights doctrine as it related to
use of the water was that the riparian landowner had the right
to make a reasonable use of waters flowing through, by, or standing
on his property so long as his use of the water did not adversely
7. N.D. SESs. LAWS ch. 419 § 7 (1963). The citation in the current Code prior to repeal
was N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-13 (1960).
8. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 875, 880-81 (Va. 1904), quoting LEWIS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 83 (2d ed. 1900). For recent discussions of the nature and extent of riparian
rights, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 16 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Note, The Riparian
Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. REv. 757 (1969). For cases recognizing a
variety of specific uses as being riparian, see People v. Hulbert, 91 N.W. 211 (Mich. 1902)
1house and farm purposes) ; Brummun' v. Vogel. 168 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 1969) (watering
of stock); Platt v. Rapid City, 291 N.W. 600 (S.D. 1940) (irrigation) ; and Petition of
Clinton Water Dist., 218 P.2d 309 (Wasb 1950) (boating, bathing, swimming, and fish-
ing). While navigability of a body of water'is important in determining the scope of ri-
parian rights, see 93 C.J.S., Waters, §§ 5-14, problems and definitions concerning naviga-
bility were discussed In Beck, Boundar, Litigation ond Legislation in North Dakota, 41
N.D.L. REv. 424, 441-44 (1965), and will not be repeated herein. See also Beck, Govern-
mental Refilling of Lakes and Ponds and the Artificial Maintenance of Water Levels:
Must Just Compensation Be Paid to Abutting Landowners?, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 180 (1967).
9. For an extensive discussion of North Dakota law on this subject, see Beck, Boundary
Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REv. 424, 445-55 (1965) and Beck.
The Wandering Missouri: A Study in Accretion Law, 43 N.D.L. REv. 429 (1967).
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affect the lands of his neighbors. The rule was modified in various
ways from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but the essential kernel re-
mained the idea that abutting landowners could use water for their
own purposes.
The Code's treatment of water differently depending on whether
or not it is running in a definite stream is an approach that has
been recognized generally by the courts. 10 "Definite stream" appears
to be a reference to the'common law test whether the water flows
in a defined natural watercourse or not," and the contrast drawn
is with diffused surface waters and percolating groundwater on the
other hand. In North Dakota a watercourse is defined by statute:
A watercourse entitled to the protection of the law is consti-
tuted if there is sufficient natural and accustomed flow of
water to form and maintain a distinct and well defined chan-
nel. It is not essential that the supply of water should be con-
tinuous or from a perennial living source. It is enough if the
flow arises periodically from natural causes and reaches a
plainly defined channel of permanent character.2
Although located in a different title of the code than the repealed
riparian rights section, this definition describes "water running in
a definite stream" and should have been the applicable definition.'3
Furthermore, the section on public ownership at least in part adopts
the "well defined channel" test for distinguishing the two types
of surface waters.
4
In 1881 the Territorial Legislature passed a statute that read
in part as follows:
[A]ny person . . . who may have or hold a title . . . to any
mineral or agricultural lands within the limits of this Terri-
tory, shall be entitled to the usual enjoyment of the waters
of the streams or creeks in said Territory for mining, milling,
agricultural or domestic purposes; Provided, That the right
to such use shall not interfere with any prior right or claim
to such waters when the law has been complied with . . ."1
This statute appears to grant the right to any landowner to use
waters of the state as long as he does not interfere with prior rights.
10. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RlIGHTS IN THE WEST 12 (U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture, 1942).
11. See id. at 9.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-06 (1960).
13. See Larson, supra note 4, at 259-60; Froemke v. Parker, 41 N.D. 408, 171 N.W. 214
(1919).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01(1) (1960).
15. LAWS OF TERRITORY OF DAKOTA ch. 142 § 1 (1881). This approach was reenforced In
N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 173 (1899) which first introduced the concept of filing for water
rights.
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Thus, acquisition of water rights would be limited no longer to
riparian or overlying lands. It seems reasonable to interpret the
statute as conferring rights on nonriparian landowners since the
statute directly refers to a situation where a landowner has no
water on his premises, allowing him a right of way over other
lands to divert and conduct water to his lands.16 Although this
statute did not directly refer to riparian rights, the United States
Surpeme Court in Sturr v. Beck1 7 considered it, as well as the
1866 statute, in determining the status of riparian rights in the
Dakota Territory. In sustaining the decision of the Territorial Su-
preme Court and upholding the right of a riparian landowner to
enjoin any interference with water riparian to his property by a
nonriparian appropriator where the riparian owner's chain of title
and possession predated the nonriparian appropriation, the Court
referred to the water rights of the riparian homesteader as "vested
and accrued."' 8 The riparian landowner prevailed in this case even
though he had not applied any of the water to beneficial use, the
Court basing its decision on the date that the riparian landowner's
patent vested as giving priority rather than the date the waters
had been put to beneficial use. The Court considered significant
the fact that the dispute was between two private parties: "The
question is not as to the extent of Smith's interest in the homestead
as against the government, but whether as against Sturr his lawful
occupancy under settlement and entry was not a prior appropriation
which Sturr could not displace." 19 The Court used the term "prior
appropriation" when in fact there was and had been no appropriation
for beneficial use, the sole basis for plaintiff's action being his
status as a riparian landowner. Involved also was a federal statute
whereunder an original patent would transfer water rights subject
only to rights that had previously vested under Territorial law.
2
0
The Court found the conclusion consistent with "the applicable cus-
tom" of the Territory. The case raises a question as to the scope
of protection to be afforded riparian rights to use of water. May
the Territory or State change to a prior appropriation system and
at the same time cut off riparian rights without payment of com-
pensation?
In 1889 North Dakota adopted its Constitution which included
the following as section 210: "All flowing streams and natural water-
courses shall forever remain the property of the state for mining,
16. Id. § 2.
17. 133 U.S. 541 (1890).
18. Id. at 552.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. 16 Stat. 218, 43 U.S.C. 681 (1958). See, discussion at notes 223-25 and accompanying
text, infra.
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irrigating and manufacturing purposes.' 22 This provision seeks to
maintain permanently at least a limited state ownership theory.
What effect, if any, did adoption of this provision have on the
riparian rights doctrine? In Bigelow v. Draper22 the Supreme Court
of North Dakota had occasion to deal with this issue.
The Court in Bigelow affirmed the existence of riparian rights
in North Dakota. The Court said that section 210 of the North
Dakota Constitution had not abrogated those rights, observing that
"the right to reasonable use of the stream [by the riparian owner]
was as much his property as the land itself. ' 23 The Court thought
that by virtue of the common 'law doctrines in force in Dakota
Territory at the time of admission to statehood, riparian owners
were "vested" with specified property rights in the beds of natural
watercourses and in the water itself. These rights were protected
by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and ac-
cordingly could not be impaired except by due process of law.
Such property could not be taken without compensation having been
made to the injured parties, and on the facts of Bigelow the court
required such compensation be made. In referring to the North
Dakota Constitution, the Court observed: "It follows that Section
210 of the state constitution would itself be unconstitutional insofar
as it attempted to destroy these vested rights of property."24 The
riparian rights that the court dealt with in Bigelow included the
right to title to the bed of a non-navigable stream and to reasonable
use of the water. This right to a reasonable use of the water included
the right to have the continued flow of the stream on or by the
property. It is not clear from the opinion to what extent, if any,
the riparian owner had been using water from the stream. Appar-
ently the Court did not consider that factor significant.
Several subsequent North Dakota cases affirmed various aspects
of common law riparian rights doctrine. In 1917 the Supreme Court
of North Dakota said that the uses to which a riparian may put
the water include manufacturing, agricultural, and similar pur-
poses.25 The right to have a stream flow "in its natural quantity
and purity" i's subject to the right of reasonable use by each riparian
owner, and reasonableness is a question of fact for the court to
decide. 26 In this case the plaintiff riparian owner was in the ice
21. N.D. CONST. art. 17, § 210. Apparently the language is taken from the Desert Land
Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, ch. 107: "and all surplus water over and above such actual ap-
propriation and use, together with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water
supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the ap-
propriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject
to existing rights."
22. 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570' (1896).
23. Id. at 163, 69 N.W. at 573.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 38 N.D. 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917).
26. Id. at 472, 165 N.W. at 505.
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business and had been cutting ice from the river and selling it.
Defendant riparian owner had a flour mill on the river from which
sufficient wastes allegedly were deposited in the river to render
the water unusable for ice purposes, thus destroying the plaintiff's
business. The suit was an action for damages. While referring to
the riparian statute, the Court observed,"The right to the use of
the water in its natural flow is not a mere easement or appurten-
ance, but is a natural right inseparably annexed to the soil itself,
which arises immediately with every new division or severance
of ownership. ' '27 The case deals essentially with the relative rights
of two riparian owners, and the plaintiff failed in his burden of
proof. In 1940 the North Dakota Supreme Court again recognized
riparian rights, quoting both of the previous North Dakota cases
with approval, and held that riparian rights-may be severed from
the land by contractual agreement, at least to the extent of possible
future claims against the other contracting party, and that such
a contract is binding upon subsequent owners. 28
Thus a riparian right to reasonable use of water has been recog-
nized in North Dakota over a long period as a property right that
accompanies transfer of title to the riparian land unless severed
therefrom, and regardless of whether or not the water has been
used. While the decisions were to this effect in the first two cases,
Sturr and Bigelow, the language in the two later cases reiterates
the earlier position. Thus in the early stages of development the
North Dakota Supreme Court and the Legislative Assembly enter-
tained the view that the riparian landowner had vested rights in
the water that took precedence over the rights of later appropriators
and that these rights consituted property. It would seem, too, that
little importance was attached to the fact that the rights had never
been used; they existed solely by virtue of the riparian status of
the particular landowner and "vested" when the riparian status
of the land arose.
In 1905, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly passed a statute
reinforcing the appropriation doctrine first introduced in 1881. 29 The
1905 legislation was ostensibly for the purpose of aiding irrigation.
The essence of the appropriation doctrine is that any person needing
water for beneficial use may divert water for such use and will
thereby acquire a vested right to continue such use regardless of
whether or not such appropriator has riparian rights in the water.
27. Id.
28. Johnson v. Armour & Co., 69 N.D. 769, 291 N.W. 113 (1940).
29. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 34 (1905). This chapter is entitled: "Irrigation Code." A direct
predecessor of the 1905 law was the irrigation water rights law of 1901. N.D. Sess. Laws
ch. 212 (1901).
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Under this type of system, priority in time plus a beneficial use,
rather than location of land, gives the better right.
Clearly from 1905, ,if not from 1881, and until the repeal of
the statute which had embodied the riparian rights doctrine, North
Dakota recognized both the riparian rights and. appropriation doc-
trines simultaneously. Arguably, when the riparian'rights statute
was repealed in 1963, the state changed from the combined riparian
rights and appropriation doctrines to the appropriation doctrine alone.
That it did so for purposes of future acquisition of water rights
seems certain. But the effect of the repeal of the riparian rights
statute with respect to then existing riparian water rights presents
several problems, including some of constitutional magnitude.
The 1905 enactment clearly was more significant for the appro-
priation system than any previous enactment because of its broad
scope. It declared that "all water within the limits of the state
from all sources of water supply belong to the public and, except
as to navigable waters, are subject to appropriation for beneficial
use."3 0 It established priority in time of appropriation for beneficial
use as the test to determine who had the better right to use water.3 1
It declared that application of water to beneficial uses constituted
a public purpose so that the power of eminent domain could be
used when necessary, and it created administrative machinery to
supervise the system.82 The language of the 1905 Code was consistent
with a dual system of water use; it did not state that prior appropri-
ation was the only method. This conclusion seems particularly correct
when the primary focus of the 1905 statute is viewed as support
for irrigation and the discussion of other uses therein seems to
be only incidental to this primary focus. When that statute stated:
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of
the right to use of water. . .", it undoubtedly meant as to the
water appropriated pursuant to the statute for irrigation purposes
and not as to any and all purposes. 33 In substance this law continued
in force until the mid-1950's. In 195534 and 1957 35 amendments to
the law enlarged the scope of the 1905 act and made it more specific
by a delineation of the types of water that belong to the public
and are subject to appropriation.
The 1955 amendment changed the 1905 language to read as fol-
lows:
30. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 34, § 1 (1905).
31. Id. § 2.
32. Id. §§ 3, 5-65.
93. Id. § 2. Not only is the chapter entitled "Irrigation Code," but all specific relevant
references to water uses throughout the chapter are to irrigation.
34. N.D. Sess. 'Laws ch. 345 (1955).
35. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 372 (1957).
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All waters within the limits of the state from the following
sources of water supply, namely:
1. Waters on the surface of the earth excluding diffused sur-
face waters but including surface waters whether flowing in
well defined channels or flowing through lakes, ponds, or
marshes which constitute integral parts of a stream system,
or waters in lakes; and
2. Waters under the surface of the earth whether such wa-
ters flow in defined subterranean channels or are diffused
percolating underground waters;
belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for bene-
ficial use and the right to the use of these waters for such
use, shall be acquired pursuant to the provisions of chapter
61-04 of the Revised Code of North Dakota of 1943 and acts
amendatory thereof.36
The Legislative Assembly also added the following provision to the
law:
The several and reciprocal rights of a riparian owner, other
than a municipal corporation, in the waters of the state com-
prise the ordinary or natural use of water for domestic and
stockwatering purposes.
3
It seems clear that the legislation was intended to affect riparian
rights.3 8 The first provision stated that the right to use of the public
waters was to be pursuant to the specified Code provisions, and by
implication, in no other way. The second provision then provided a
special exception by indicating that riparian rights would continue
"for domestic and stockwatering purposes for the general public."
Were municipal corporations being treated more or less favorably
than the general public? It appears that the 1955 Legislative Assem-
bly said if a vested riparian right has not already been acquired,
such a right could be acquired only for domestic and stock water-
ing purposes.
The 1957 amendment changed the first quoted provision of the
1955 law to read as follows:
AU waters within the limits of the state from the following
sources of water supply, namely:
1. Waters on the surface of the earth excluding diffused
surface waters but including surface waters whether flowing
in well defined channels or flowing through lakes, ponds, or
86. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 845 § 1 (1955). The 1905 Act language is quoted in the text at
note 30.
87. Id. at § 2.
88. See I son, upra note 4, at 264-65.
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marshes which constitute integral parts of a stream system,
or waters in lakes; and
2. Waters under the surface of the earth whether such waters
flow in defined subterranean channels or are diffused per-
colating underground waters; and
3. All residual waters resulting from beneficial use, and all
waters artificially drained; and
4. All waters, excluding privately owned waters, in areas
determined by the state engineer to be noncontributing drain-
age areas. A noncontributing drainage area is hereby defined
to be any area which does not contribute natural flowing
surface water to a natural stream or watercourse at an av-
erage frequency oftener than once in three years over the
latest thirty year period;
belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial use and the right to the use of these waters for
such use, shall be acquired pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 61-04 of the Revised Code of North Dakota of 1943
and acts amendatory thereof.
39
The second provision of the 1955 amendment quoted above was not
repealed until 1963 at the same time that the original 1866 riparian
rights statute was repealed.40 As a result of the 1957 amendment,
the only waters specifically exempted from appropriation are (1)
certain diffused surface waters and (2) privately owned waters.
Two relevant North Dakota Supreme Court cases have been de-
cided recently. Early in 1963 the Court decided Volkmann v. City of
Crosby. 41 Volkmann involved the right of a landowner to prevent
interference with an artesian well in subterranean percolating
groundwaters underneath his property. The Court recognized the pre-
vious North Dakota cases dealing with natural streams, quoted, them
with approval, and noted the distinction between those cases and the
present one with the observation:
Certain it is that the rights of the landowner provided by
this statute4 2 with respect to subterranean waters not form-
ing a definite stream, are no less than those which he has in
definite streams flowing on the surface that were under con-
sideration in the cases from which we have just quoted.
4 3
The Court might well have concluded that his interest would be
greater, in other words not just a reasonable use but absolute own-
39. N.D. Sess. Laws ch 372 § 1 (1957).
40. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 419 § 7 (1963). For the 1955 Amendment language see text at
note 37, supra. For the 1866 statute see text at note 6, supra.
41. 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963).
42. N.D. CENT. CoD § 47-01-13 (1960), repealed, N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 419 § 7 (1963).
43. Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18, 22 (N.D. 1963).
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ership. However, it chose not to do that: "His property right, how-
ever, is not an unlimited one, but is subject to the rule of reasonable
use and may be appropriated by him for beneficial use.' " Cases
relied on by the Court indicate that perhaps this reasonable use
language is to be interpreted in relation to other landowners over-
lying the same pool of water so as to constitute a correlative rights
doctrine. In Volkmann, the defendant, City of Crosby, was not an
overlying landowner and did not use the water it withdrew on over-
lying land. If it had been an overlying landowner, it is doubtful that
the Court would have allowed it to use the water off the premises
to the detriment of a previous beneficial use by another overlying
landowner. In any event, the most that this case can be said to hold
is that an appropriation of percolating groundwater by someone who
is not an overlying landowner and for use on premises other than
overlying land cannot interfere with a previous beneficial use of the
ground water by an overlying landowner on his premises. The case
suggests that the overlying owner is not entitled to any further
protection; he must have a prior beneficial use to have a vested-
right. But the facts did not call for such a holding.
The nature of the interference should be noted also. What de-
fendant's tapping of the groundwater did was to reduce the water
pressure so that plaintiff's artesian well which was adequate before
was no longer adequate to satisfy needs. The Court made no deter-
mination that defendant's use of the water would leave plaintiff with-
out an adequate supply of groundwater. Plaintiff might well have
been able to readily sink a shaft and obtain water. So what the
Court appears to be doing is not only protecting plaintiff's supply,
but plaintiff's existing access to it as well.
The clear import of the 1963 repeal of the 1866 statute declaring
ownership in the overlying landowner of percolating groundwaters
and the existence of riparian rights was that from 1963 no further
rigarian rights to use of water could be acquired in North Dakota; 4'
previously vested riparian rights were not affected. But what was
the scope of previously vested riparian rights? Were they, according
to Sturr v. Beck 6 and Bigelow v. Draper,47 abstract rights to rea-
sonable use of water by anyone who had acquired riparian land or
were they only to use such amounts as had been put to actual ben-
eficial use in connection with the riparian land prior to the effective
date of the 1963 repeal?
In 1968, in Baeth v. Hoisveen.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court
44. Id.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-13 (1960), repealed N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 419 § 7 (1968).
46. 133 U.S. 541 (1890) (discussed in text accompanying notes 17-19, supra).
47. 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896) (discussed in text accompanying notes 22-24, supra).
48. 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
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adopted the view that although a riparian owner had rights in the
water, these rights are vested only if and when the riparian owner
makes actual use of the water for a beneficial purpose and until
that time prior appropriators may acquire a better right. It should
follow that as of 1963 all riparian rights to use of water that had
never been exercised were abolished or were treated as never hav-
ing existed.
In Baeth the plaintiff held title to lands with a continuous chain
of title dating back to a patent issued in 1898. In 1961 plaintiff ap-
plied for a permit to draw water from a stream that flowed under
his property. Because of other pending applications, the State En-
gineer allowed plaintiff only 20 per cent of the water sought in the
permit application. Plaintiff then brought an action pursuant to stat-
ute seeking to have additional water rights declared in his favor. In
response, the Court outlined the scope of the rights acquired under
the statute. The Court said that a landowner acquires a water right in
an underground stream "following withdrawal and application of
said groundwater to a beneficial use.' 49 The Court held that the 1866
riparian rights statute merely codified a usufructary right; the Court
referred to the 1955 amendment that specified all groundwaters as
being within the public domain" and said that since the plaintiff
had not applied the groundwater to beneficial use before 1955 his
riparian right to use of the water had not vested. However, because
of that portion of the 1955 amendment recognizing riparian use for
domestic and stockwatering purposes, this conclusion of the Court
should be read to mean that the right to acquire further riparian
rights to use of water ended in 1955 for all except domestic and stock-
watering purposes. The right to acquire further riparian rights to
use water for domestic and stockwatering purposes ended in 1963
with the repeal of all riparian rights authorization statutes.
The Court in Baeth held that -there was no unconstitutional de-
privation of property despite the language of Bigelow v. Draper and
other earlier North Dakota cases. The Court neither distinguished
nor overruled Bigelow, but treated it as follows:
Notwithstanding what this court said in Bigelow v. Draper
. . . and in subsequent supporting decisions which may be
construed to the contrary to what is said in the instant
case, we hold that there is no deprivation of a constitutional
right or rights, and that the action taken by the legislature
in enacting Section 61-01-01, N.D.C.C., is within the police
power of the state, as a reasonable regulation for the pub-
lic good.51
49. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
50. N.D. Seas. Laws ch. 345 (1955) (discussed in text accompanying note 36, supra).
51. Baeth v. Holsveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968).
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Hopefully the Court is not seeking to distinguish these earlier cases
on the basis that they dealt with surface streams whereas Baeth
deals with an underground stream. The riparian rights should be the
same and that would seem to be the intent of the statute repealed
in 1963. However, it must be recognized that Baeth dealt with an
underground stream and that therefore we do not have a holding
with reference to a surface stream. It may be that the Court meant only
to say that the Bigelow and other early language was overly broad
and unnecessary.
Regardless, based on the general comments of the Court in
Baeth to the effect that landowners only acquire "vested" rights in
water upon application to beneficial use,5 2 it seems likely that the
same rule will be applied to riparian rights in surface waters if such
litigation is brought before the Court. Finally, since Volkmann sug-
gests that ownership rights to percolating subterranean groundwa-
ters are vested only if applied to beneficial use, it may be that the
only riparian and common law water rights that will be valid in
North Dakota are those rights proven to be based on a beneficial
use prior to the enactment of the 1955 statute or repeal in 1963 of
the statutes previously discussed.53
Constitutional problems are overcome by treating the riparian
water uses as inchoate until such time as they are used. 54 The North
Dakota statutes do not attempt to abolish all riparian rights. They
do only three things: (1) limit the creation of new riparian rights to
use of water between 1955 and 1963 to domestic and stockwatering
uses; (2) prevent the creation of any new riparian rights to use of
water after 1963; and (3) bar the exercise of inchoate or unused
riparian rights subsequent to 1955 and 1963, except as noted in (1).
All other riparian rights continue such as to ownership of the bed
underlying non-navigable waters, to alluvion formed by accretion
and reliction and so on, as well as to the continued use of water
that had been applied to beneficial use. The scope of the legislative
acts can therefore be seen as police power regulation rather than
taking of property.
Assuming then that the only remaining riparian rights to use of
water are those that vested by having been put to beneficial use
prior to 1955 and 1963 respectively as discussed previously, several
problems arise. What if a riparian landowner used the stream to
52. Id.
53. Existing riparian rights are recognized in current North Dakota Century Code provi-
sions. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-02-22, 61-02-45 (1960). However, the scope of these existing
riparian rights is not defined by the statutes.
54. This reasoning has been used in other areas of the law such as in restricting or
abolishing dower and possibilities of reverter. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d
475 (Mass. 1958) (dower) ; Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 I1. 2d
486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955) (possibility of reverter).
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feed cattle from 1943 to 1948, but has not done so since? Does he
have a vested riparian right to use the water for feeding cattle at
the rate used from 1943 to 1948? Can vested riparian rights be aban-
doned?55 The present Code provision on abandonment of water rights
after three years of nonuse does not appear intended to apply to
riparian rights.56 It applies to the appropriated rights acquired pur-
suant to the North Dakota Code. If it is permissible to treat rip-
arian rights to use of water as vesting only when water is applied
to beneficial use, it would seem equally permissible to treat them
as continuing vested only during the period that they are being ap-
plied to beneficial use.
When do riparian rights to use of the water for recreation or
aesthetic purposes vest? When has there been beneficial use for these
purposes? Are these accepted riparian uses of the water?57 It is per-
haps desirable and likely that these, like navigation, would be held
to be public rather than private uses of water, thus not within the
scope of riparian rights. It is true that current North Dakota appro-
priation law recognizes recreation and wildlife purposes as a bene-
ficial use,58 but that is not necessarily inconsistent with a7 finding
that for riparian purposes they are public and not private uses of
water. Such a decision would facilitate the statute's regulatory
scheme.
In summary, it is clear that private ownership rights in waters
within North Dakota have existed in the past through common law
and riparian rights doctrines. The relevant conclusions appear to be
as follows:
1. Riparian and overlying landowners had a usufructuary
right to a reasonable use of the water in all bodies of water
on, under, or flowing past'their lands and the use extended
to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes.
2. The usufructuary right did not vest until the water had
been put to one of the beneficial uses and then only to the
extent of that beneficial use.
3. The ability to create new vested uses ceased in 1955 with
reference to all sources of water except that riparian own-
ers could continue creating vested use rights to riparian
waters for domestic and stockwatering purposes.
55. Are they profits a prendre and therefore separate from but appendant to the riparian
land fee or are they an unseparated integral part of that fee? Hornbook law says that
profits can be abandoned whereas fee estates cannot be. W. BuaRY, REAL PROPERTY 91-92
(3d ed. 1965).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-23 (Supp. 1973). The reference therein is to "appropria-
tions of water" and the context seems to be the appropriation made pursuant to the Code
provisions.
57. Cf. Cases cited note 8 supra. In petition of Clinton Water Dist., 218 P.2d 309, 312
(Wash. 1950), the Court treats "boating, bathing, swimming, and fishing" as riparian uses.
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973).
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4. The ability to create new riparian vested use rights for
domestic and stockwatering purposes ceased in 1963.
5. The persons who acquired such vested use rights prior to
1955 and 1963 respectively still own such rights unless they
have been lost through failure to continue the beneficial use.
6. While it might be constitutionally permissible to enact
legislation requiring that such riparian use rights be regis-
tered within a stated period of time or lost through forfei-
ture, no such statute presently exists in North Dakota.
Thus, the State of North Dakota when seeking to plan water re-
source use may not know the extent of such previously vested com-
mon law and riparian rights unless it undertakes an independent
inventory.
B. RIGHTS OF APPROPRIATORS UNDER THE NORTH DAKOTA
STATUTES
The North Dakota Century Code provides:
All waters within the limits of the State from the following
sources . . . belong to the public and are subject to appro-
priation for beneficial use and the right to the use of these
waters for such use shall be acquired pursuant to the pro-
visions of . . . [the . . . Code of North Dakota]...59
This provision makes it clear that private parties may acquire rights
to use of the public waters. Three specific limitations are given:
(1) the acquisition must be by appropriation, (2) it must be for bene-
ficial use, and (3) it must be pursuant to the Code provisions. Thus,
the rights of private appropriators in the public waters of North Da-
kota are governed primarily by specific provisions of the North Da-
kota Century Code.60 This section of the article discusses the rights
or interests in water that can be created through the application
and interpretation of the Code provisions. One of the basic principles
of the appropriation doctrine incorporated into the Code is that
priority in time gives priority in right.6' Even riparian rights are
subject to appropriations which vested prior in time to the riparian
rights.6
2
The two principal North Dakota agents or agencies involved in
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 61-01 to 61-04 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973). N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-01-01 (1960) in using the word "shall" Implies that rights to use the stated wa-
ters cannot be acquired by any other method.
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973). For a thorough discussion of the early
development of the appropriation doctrine, including the central role of the first in time
concept, see Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law,
in 1 WATEtS AND WATER RIGHTS 57, 74-83 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
62. Larson, supra note 4, at 251-53.
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administering this appropriation system are the State Engineer 8
and the State Water Conservation Commission.64 The Code provides
that for some beneficial uses an application for a permit must be
filed with the State Engineer and, if approved, it will result in, a
conditional and/or perfected water permit;651 on the other-hand, for
some beneficial uses an individual simply may proceed to appropri-
ate the water. The Code specifically provides that "neither a con-
ditional nor a perfected water permit shall be required of a land-
owner or his lessee to appropriate water from any source or any
constructed' works for domestic and livestock uses."' 6 This privilege
is qualified in that a permit must be secured before constructing
impoundments that can hold more than twelve and one-half (121/)
acre feet of water, even though the water might be used solely for
livestock or domestic purposes.6 T The exemption or privilege does
mean that the primary thrust of the permit system is for irrigation
and industry uses.
In planning for water use it makes sense not to be overly con-
cerned with nonconsumptive uses or with consumptive uses that re-
quire only a small amount of water, assuming there is a substan-
tial water resource. The more paperwork and processing the regu-
latory agency needs to do, the more man-hours that have to be ex-
pended. However, in some areas of North Dakota water shortages
may occur more readily than in others, and it might be desirable
in those areas to have more control over small consumptive uses
and even nonconsumptive uses of the water.6 8 The Code also pro-
vides 'that anyone
63. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-03 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-02 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973). Several aspects of the
work of the State Water Conservation Commission have been explored in a previous ar-
ticle: Bard & Beck, An Institutional Overview of the North Dakota State Water Conserva-
tion Commission: Its Operation and Setting, 46 N.D.L. REv. 31 (1969).
65. N.D. CEN'r. CODE ch. 61-04 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973). These procedures were
discussed in some detail in Bard & Beck, supra note 64, at 39-43, and will not be repeated
herein. Furthermore, by saying that a permit is not required for some users, the Code
implies its necessity for other ones.
66. N.D. CEN'. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973). Both domestic and livestock uses are
defined in the .Code: " 'Livestock use' shall mean the use of water for drinking purposes
by herds, flocks or bands of domestic animals." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1(2) (Supp.
1973). Since this definition includes only drinking purposes it does not include sanitary
purposes. In some livestock operations it may be necessary to use water to flush pens or
feeding areas. "Domestic use" shall mean the use of water by an individual or by a family.
unit, or household, for personal needs and for household purposes, including, but not limited
to heating, drinking, washing, sanitary and culinary uses; irrigation of land not exceeding
one acre in area for noncommercial gardens, orchard, lawns, trees or shrubbery; and for
household pets and domestic animals kept for household sustenance whether the water is
supplied by the individual, a municipal government or by a privately owned public utility or
other agency." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1(1) (Supp. 1973).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-02 (Supp. 1973) adds "fish, wildlife and other recreational
uses" to those not requiring a permit.
However, as soon as any "constructed works" have been completed for any of the
foregoing purposes, the water users must notify the state engineer of the location and
acre-feet capacity of such works. Id.
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973).,
68. Water conservation is identified as one of the three reasons for enacting the North
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intending to acquire the right to the beneficial use of any
waters, before commencing any construction for such pur-
pose or before taking the same from any constructed works,
shall make an application to the state engineer for a water
permit unless such construction or taking from such con-
structed works is for domestic or livestock purposes or for
fish, wildlife and other recreational uses. However, immedi-
ately upon completing any constructed works for domestic or
livestock purposes or for fish, wildlife and other recreation-
al uses the water user shall notify the state engineer of such
constructed works, dam or dug-out's location and acre-feet
capacity. Regardless of proposed use, however, all water
users shall secure a water permit prior to constructing an
impoundment capable of retaining more than twelve and one-
half acre-feet of water.
6 9
So the law seems to do three things. First, the law in general says
that a permit is not necessary to use water for domestic or live-
stock purposes. Second, it says that in general if water is to be used
for domestic, livestock, or for fish, wildlife and other recreational
uses, it is not necessary to get a permit to construct works, but
once there is a "constructed works, dam or dug-out" the State En-
gineer must be notified of its location and acre-feet capacity. How-
ever, the law does not specify any penalty for failing to so notify
the State Engineer. Third, any impoundment of more than 121/2. acre-
feet capacity-will require a permit.
If then a permit is required for certain beneficial uses, two im-
portant questions arise: (1) What are the prerequisites for obtaining
the permit, and (2) Once the permit has, been acquired, what is the
nature of the use right and of the protection that the permittee will
receive for his water use? These two questions will be discussed in
that order.
What are the prerequisites for obtaining the permit? The Code
specifies the procedural format for filing an application with the
State Engineer. 70 Assuming these procedures are followed, is the
applicant entitled to a permit? The answer is, not necessarily. On
what basis then may the State Engineer deny a permit? First, "If,
in the opinion of the state engineer, no unappropriated water is
available, he shall reject an application." 7 1 Second, "He may refuse
Dakota water law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-01 (1960). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-26
(1960).
69. N.D. CErNT. CODE § 61-04-02 (Supp. 1973).
70. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-04 (1960), as amended (Supp. 1973). See also Bard & Beck,
supra note 64, at 39-43.
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-07 (1960). Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968),
raises a substantial question whether the State Engineer can continue to approve appropria-
tion requests which may result in the appropriation of all of the water from a given source
while, there still remains land associated with that water source that has not received a
fair share of the water. Must there be "equitable apportionment"? A strong argument can
be 'made from Baeth that there must be such apportionment where there are several
pending applications from one source.
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to consider or approve an application . . . if, in his opinion, the
approval thereof would be contrary to the public interest. ' 72 Ap-
parently "public interest" is a sufficient standard to meet constitu-
tional challenges, 73 but to what does the public interest criteria here
relate, to the use of the water resources or to some more general
public issues? Suppose, for example, that a private entity discrim-
inates against certain minority groups, could the state engineer deny
a water permit on the basis that he objects to this discrimination as
being against the public interest? Or must his "public interest" ob-
jection be water related? The statute is not clear; arguments can
be made either way. Public interest will provide a more substantial
standard if it related to the use of water. For example, the State
Engineer might decide that when an applicant requests all of the re-
maining unappropriated water from a particular source and other
lands remain to be developed, it would be against the "public in-
terest" to appropriate it all to one applicant. 74 In any event, if the
State Engineer denies the application, the applicant may appeal to
the district court.
7 5
Once the permit has been acquired, what is the nature of the
use right and of the protection that the permittee will receive for
his water use? Several subsidiary questions arise: (1) How long may
the use continue? (2) May the use be transferred to another party?
(3) May the use be changed from one purpose to another?
The Code specifically provides that "water rights of whatever
character" can be condemned by the State Water Commission.76
While this clearly includes riparian water rights, it would appear to
include appropriated rights as well. If it does include appropriated
water rights, it constitutes a recognition by the Legislative Assembly
that such use rights can constitute "property," and in all probability
the issuance of a perfected water permit establishes a property right.
This would be a usufructuary right to the continued use of the water
except as qualified by the then existing law or any conditions ex-
pressly attached to the permit.
Any analysis of the nature of a permit must begin with an anal-
ysis of the permit. The custom has been to grant the right to per-
petual use of the water.7 7 No express provision of the Code requires
72. Id.
73. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26-30 (3d ed. 1972) New York Central See.
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
74. Perhaps this sort of policy view motivated the North Dakota Supreme Court when
it criticized the permit allocation system as applied in Baeth v. E-otsveen, 157 N.W.2d 728
(N.D. 1968). See discussion supra note 71.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-071 (1960).
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-22 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-23 (Supp. 1973). see
alo N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-04 (1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-40 (1960).
77. In Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18, 21-22 (N.D. 1963) the Court states
that the permit granted was for " 'a perpetual right . . . to the use of ground water.' "
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this result. The only basic discussion of the time element in the
Code relates to the amount of time a permittee is to have between
the receipt of his conditional permit and the time 'he actually puts
the water to beneficial use. 7 Even the issuance of a 10 year per-
mit with an option to renew in the permittee by refiling 'before ex-
piration of the permit term would be beneficial. The affirmative
action required of the permittee would bring him into contact with
the State Engineer and would give evidence that the use was ac-
tive. If no application came forth, the Engineer could investigate
and if it showed no oversight on the permittee's part terminate the
water right. Also, the State Engineer may attach conditions to a per-
fected water permit and failure to abide by these conditions could
result in a forfeiture of the permit. The Code provides: "The state
engineer shall issue the perfected water permit, setting forth the
actual capacity of the works and such limitations upon the water
permit as shall be warranted by the condition of the works and to the
extent and under the conditions of the actual application of the water
to a beneficial use."' 79 It is perhaps an understatement to say that
this language is unclear, but ,it is the only Code language giving
express authority to attach conditions to water permits. In response
to the energy crisis and because of the possible environmental dam-
age- from strip mining, a variety of conditions have been attached
to conditional water permits recently issued to companies that would
be heavy consumers of strip-mined coal. 0
The only specific statutory reason for termination of a water
use permit is failure to put the water to beneficial use for three
successive years, and even then there will be no forfeiture if ces-
sation was due to unavailability of water, justifiable inability to com-
plete the works, "or other good and sufficient cause." 81 Permits held
by a state agency, department, board, commission, or institution can
.be forfeited only through legislative action.82 The Code contains pro-
visions relating to notice, hearing, and appeal to the district court
in case of such termination.
8 3
An argument can be made that the phrase "beneficial use" is
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-14 (Supp. 1973).
79. N.D. CENT. CODs § 61-04-09 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
80. Recent conditional permits issued to Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc., contain sev-
eral conditions including: "9) The applicant shall require his coal suppliers to accomplish
total reclamation of the lands mined or disturbed while furnishing coal for plant operation
and shall make water available at a reasonable cost to the coal supplier in the event that
the reclamation agency requires the application of supplemental water to aid' new plant
growth on lands to be reclaimed in the total reclamation process." SWC Water Permit No.
1963. A similar condition was included in SWC Water Permit No. 1964 also issued to Minn-
kota Power Cooperative, Inc.
81. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-23; 61-04-24 (Supp. 1973). See also, N.D. CENT. CODE
61-03-21 (Supp. 1973) for forfeiture of water permit based on failure to maintain and
operate adequate water reservoir structures.
82. N.D. CENT. CODs § 61-04-23 (Supp. 1973).
83. N.D. CENT. CODs §§ 61-04-24; 61-04-25 (Supp. 1973).
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open to interpretation and that, for example, the use of water for
coal gasification is not a beneficial use because the process en-
courages strip-mining and pollutes the air and water. The Code does
assign a key role to this concept: "Beneficial uses shall be the
basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to the use of water.""
However, because of the specified general uses in the Code,85 it is
unlikely that a court would say anything other than that the per-
mittee must be using the water for domestic, livestock, irrigation,
industry, fish, wildlife, or other outdoor recreational uses. If the water
is being used for one of these purposes, it is a beneficial use of
the sort the Code is referring to.
The Code contains only one provision dealing with the transfer
of water rights86 Under it, several matters are dealt with. First,
transfer or assignment of any water permit issued for irrigation
purposes may be accomplished only with the approval of the State
Engineer. Second, any transfer of title to land carries with it all
rights to the use of water appurtenant to that land for irrigation
purposes, unless such rights have been severed from the land in
accordance with the statute. Third, any water permit, whether for
irrigation or not, may be transferred by the owner from one parcel
of his land to another parcel with State Engineer appoval. Fourth,
and finally, any state agency, department, board, commission or
institution that holds a permit may temporarily transfer such permit
as approved by the State Water Commission. The varied nature
and specificity of these provisions suggest that no other transfers
of state water permits may be made.
The Code does not contain any provisions specifically dealing
with the question of whether a permit obtained for one use may
be changed to another use. One Code section does provide that
irrigation water use rights continue appurtenant to the land "unless
such rights to use water have been severed for other beneficial uses
as provided by section 61-04-15." 87 The difficulty with this provision
is that except for situations where state agencies are permittees,
section 61-04-15 does not say anything about change of use. The
earlier analysis relating to transfer of permits suggests that they
may not be so changed.
Related to the foregoing questions is another: What if there is
insufficient water to meet the needs of all appropriators? 88 Is the
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973).
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-15 (Supp. 1973). Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-38 (Supp.
1973) indicating that a water right owner may turn it over to the Commission for "con-
trol of the diversion."
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
88. The State Engineer has a basic duty to avoid such a situation arising because "If,
in * . . (his] opinion . . . no unappropriated water is available, he shall reject an applica-
tion made under the provisions of this chapter." N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-07 (1960). Of
course, times of extreme drought may arise. See also the discussion in note 71, &upra.
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matter to be handled on a straight forward, first-in-time is first-in-
right basis or is a distinction to be made depending upon the nature
of the beneficial use? The phrase "priority in time shall give the
better right" occurs only twice in the relevant Code provisions. 9
The first appearance is in the context that "as between appropriations
for the same use,"9 0 first in time is first in right. The second
appearance is in a section that refers only to irrigation uses of
the water although the first-in-time is first-in-right concept is stated
in a sentence by itself and not expressly related to the irrigation
reference. 91 In contrast to these limited references, there is the
Code provision that provides: "In all cases where the use of water
for different purposes conflicts such uses shall conform to the follow-
ing order of priority:
1. Domestic use
2. Livestock use
3. Irrigation and industry
4. Fish, wildlife and other outdoor recreational uses."9' 2
Despite the seeming general applicability of this provision, it may
well be intended to apply only in situations where conflicts arise
before a permit has been issued.93 Under such interpretation, the
provision would perform a function, yet not render inoperative the
basic principle of the appropriation system: first in time is first
in right.9 '
If protection of the permit right depends on priority of time,
its effective date is important. In this context, the Code provides
for the relation back to the date use began of a water right based
on a beneficial use existing prior to the 1905 appropriation statute
upon presentation of satisfactory proof that the water was applied
to a beneficial use as of the date claimed.9 5 Otherwise, a right
will have priority from the date of receipt of an application for
a permit in the office of the State Engineer.96 If a use has become
obsolete and a permittee is allowed to change to a modern use
without filing a new application, the old priority would be main-
tained. This may be inequitable to others seeking to use water
from the same source,and a strong argument can be made that
all requests for new uses of the water should stand on an equal
basis.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01.1; 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973). C'. N.D. CENT. COD § 61-02-31
(1960) (dealing with the priority of a water right acquired by the Commission).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973).
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
93. See Bard & Beck, An Institutional Overview of the North Dakota State Water Con-
servation Commission: Its Operation and Setting, 46 N.D.L. REv. 31, 72-74 (1969).
94. See text accompanying notes 59-62, supra.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-03 (1960).
96. Id.
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Apparently the same rules as to priorities would apply to the
uses that do not require permits, but rather than depending on
the date the application appears in the office of the State Engineer,
the priority would depend on the date that physical use began.97
Problems of proof could arise, and it might be wise for such users
to apply for water permits in order to have a clearly established
priority date. 8 At least it appears that it would be permissible
to obtain such a permit. The statute merely says that one does
not need a permit to appropriate for domestic or livestock use; 99
it does not say that one cannot obtain a permit for these purposes.
However, it would be better for all concerned if the statute specifi-
cally provided that any person applying water to beneficial use
can obtain a permit for purposes of protecting the priority of use.
The applicant would, of course, have to prove the priority date
to the satisfaction of the Sate Engineer.
A different type of private interest in water rights may arise
in the form of a lien against water rights appurtenant to real
propery. Since water rights are declared by statute to be appurten-
ances to real property, at least when they are used for irrigation,10 0
it is reasonable to conclude that an encumbrance against the land,
for example a judgment lien or assessment, becomes a lien on
the water rights as well. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue
that one who acquires the water rights takes them subject to encum-
brances. This reasoning should follow even when a water right
becomes appurtenant to the land subsequent to the attachment of
a judgment lien. The problem is whether water rights that are
severed from the encumbered land are freed, from the encumbrance.
The Code allows the State Water Conservation Commission to
issue bonds for the purpose of acquiring lands for irrigation.1 0' Such
bonds may be secured by lands or works involved in the project.
A question arises as to whether water rights appurtenant to such
lands are subject to a security interest in favor of the holders
of said bonds.
The Code also provides that the "owners of works proposing
to store or carry water in excess of their needs for beneficial
use may make application for such excess, and shall be held as
trustees of such right for the parties applying the water to beneficial
use. . . .,,10 This language appears to create an equitable interest
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01.1; 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973) (note its general language).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-02 (Supp. 1973) which states when applications must be
made does not limit applications solely to those instances nor does any other provision of
the Code.
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973).
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-02 (Supp. 1973).
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-46 (Supp. 1978).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-03 (1960).
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in water. If such an interest is created, there does not appear
to be any method of determining when and if water rights are
held in trust, who they are held for, when an equitable interest
has been transferred, whether the equitable interest in the water
is appurtenant to land, and whether the equitable or legal interest
in a water right is subject to encumbrances. Similarly, the Code
creates a lien against property of an owner for failure to pay
fees for inspection of impoundment works; 10 if such owner holds
water rights in trust for others, and the use of such rights is
made possible by the impoundment, it is unclear whether the lien
is an encumbrance upon the water rights held in trust.
An additional type of water right is the right created when
a contract is entered for the delivery of water. The statutes specify
that irrigation districts 0' as well as municipalities 05 may enter
into contracts for the sale of water to private users. Furthermore,
in recent months there has been substantial progress in developing
rural water delivery districts; apparently they are being incorporated
as nonprofit corporations. Undoubtedly delivery contracts will be
associated with them. This aspect of private water ownership rights
through contract has not been explored in this paper.
While the discussion in this section has raised questions as to
duration and transferability of permits and has pointed out ambigu-
ities in the Code provisions, and while it might be desirable for
the Legislative Assembly to resolve these, it should be pointed out
that the Legislative Assembly has given both the State Engineer and
the State Water Commission rule making power for purposes of
administering the water laws."0 6 It appears that these powers are
sufficiently broad to allow the State Engineer and the State Water
Commission to resolve the questions and ambiguities without waiting
for the Legislative Assembly to act. Furthernore, should serious
problems ever arise as to existing rights, the Code provides for
law suits to adjudicate water rights in watercourses, stream systems,
and other sources. 07
C. PREscRIPTIvE WATER RIGHTS
In 1957 the North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted a bill
103. N.D. CENT. CODE 3 61-04-11 (Supp. 1973).
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-07-29 (1960). FOr a discussion of the Garrison Diversion con-
tracting process see Beck & Newgren, Irrigation in North Dakota Through Garrison Diver-
Mlon: An inatitutiona! Overview, 44 N.D.L. REv. 465, 472-487 (1968).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-33-13 (1960). See also Satrom v. City of Grand Forks, 163
N.W.2d 522, 527 (N.D. 1968).
106. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-02-14(2) (Supp. 1973); 61-03-13 (1960).
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-23 (Supp. 1973) gives the Commission ample authority to
adjudicate such water rights. But in addition, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-16 through 61-03-19
(1960) provide for adjudication of water rights on stream systems after hydrographic sur-
vey have been completed.
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entitled: "Prescriptive Water Rights."10 8 The substantive portion
thereof read, in its entirety, as follows:
§ 1. Prescriptive Water Right. Any person, firm, corpora-
tion or municipality which used or attempted to appropriate
water from any water course, stream, body of water or from
an underground source for mining, irrigating, manufacturing
or other beneficial use over a period of twenty years prior
to January 1, 1934, shall be deemed to have acquired a right
to the use of such water without having filed or prosecuted
an application to acquire a right to the beneficial use of such
waters. Such use or attempted use of the waters is hereby
declared to be a prescriptive water right and is hereby con-
firmed and established as such. Any such prescriptive water
right acquired under this Act shall be subject to forfeiture
for nonuse as prescribed by law.109
The primary question that has been raised about this Act is whether
it purported to change vested riparian rights into prescriptive
rights .11° It is certainly not necessary to so conclude in order to
give operative effect to the statute, and it is very likely that it
does not do so. The basic difference between riparian and prescrip-
tive rights in general should first be noted. Riparian rights have
already been defined." A prescriptive right to the use of water
would be a right acquired by analogy to the doctrine of adverse
possession. 112 It would depend on a continuous, open, notorious, and
adverse user of the water for a prescribed period of time. Clearly
any riparian owner that had been using water prior to. January
1, 1934, for even just a one year period has acquired a vested
right to continue that use. For this statute to convert the right
of riparian owners who have used water for more than twenty
years into prescriptive rights and make them subject to forfeiture
for nonuse, while keeping intact the riparian rights to use of
water for those who have used it for less than twenty years, would
not make sense. The statute must be intended to apply (a) to non-
riparians who have not applied for the required 'permit and (b)
to riparians who are using the water on nonriparian lands and
therefore would have no vested interest absent a permit. When
it is considered that the reason for the enactment of the statute
108. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 375 (1957).
109. Id. § 1.
110. See Note, North Dakota Water Law: A Conatitutional Comparison, 41 N.D.L. PRnv.
545 (1965).
111. See text accompanying notes 6-14, supra.
112. "The Courts are agreed that the right to use the water of a stream in a particular
manner is one which can be acquired by prescription." 2 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WA-
TERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1744 (1904). "[I]n general it may be stated that to acquire such
rights the user must be continuous and uninterrupted, actual, open, notorious, and exclu-
sive." Id. at 1745.
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was a concern over the water rights of many municipalities, irri-
gation projects, and industries, this latter conclusion is the more
sensible."" These are the users most apt either to be nonriparians
or riparians using water to benefit nonriparian lands.
Perhaps prescriptive rights to use water could have been acquir-
ed absent the statute, but the statute makes it clear that they
can be acquired. If they were obtainable before the statute, the
question arises whether the statute depreciates the value of any
that may have vested before its passage, by making them subject
to forfeiture for nonuse. Since, if a prescriptive water right was
treated like an easement or profit a prendre, it would have been
subject to abandonment anyway, it would not appear to be apprec-
iably changed in character.11 ,
While the Act refers to "or other beneficial use," this probably
would not include domestic and livestock uses since permits are
not required for these uses in the first place. Another question
that must be raised is 'whether the Act purports to do away with
the traditional requirements for prescriptive rights, that is showing
a continued, open, notorious, and adverse user." 5 The statute is
subject to differing interpretations on this point.
In 1963 the prescriptive water rights statute was amended to
allow any member of the same class included in the prior statute
who had applied water to a-beneficial purpose for a period of
twenty years prior to the effective date of the Act to acquire a
right to appropriate water that related back to the date of its
first application to a beneficial use. 1 6 However, in order to obtain
such a right and priority, such person had to file for an appropri-
ation permit within two years from the effective date of the Act
of forfeit the claim. The State Engineer's determination as to the
validity of the claim was made subject to court review. A 1965
amendment clarified "effective date of this Act" by substituting
the date July 1, 1963.1".
The 1963 amendment did enlarge the class of persons eligible
to acquire prescriptive rights by changing the time requirement.
Previously a person had to have appropriated water for twenty
years prior to 1934, or a total of 43 years, since that statute was
enacted in 1957. Under the 1963 amendment an appropriation need
only have been made during a twenty year period prior to July
1, 1963.
118. See Eleventh Biennial Report of the State Water Conservation Commission July 1,
1956 to June 90, 1958, In 2 N.D. P. Doe. 1957-58, 1585, 1670.
114. See W. Bunvy, REAL PROPERTY 91-92 (3d ed. 1965).
115. See supra note 112.
116. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 419 § 2 (1963).
117. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 447 § 10 (1965). For the current version, see N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-22 (Supp. 1973).
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Apparently the 1963 amendment also seeks to divest prescriptive
rights that had vested under the 1957 statute and which, according
to the 1957 statute, could only be subject to forfeiture for nonuse,
by requiring that they too be filed within the two year period.
If the amendment did not intend this result, then unrecorded pre-
scriptive rights might well still exist in North Dakota.
One point seems clear whether or not unrecorded prescriptive
water rights still exist in North Dakota, new prescriptive rights
cannot be acquired. July 1, 1963 was the last day for the acquisition
of prescriptive rights under the North Dakota statutes. Since the
North Dakota Legislative Assembly has legislated on the subject
there should be little argument about the existence of any future
common law prescriptive rights.
III. STATE OR PUBLIC RIGHTS
Since the power to govern the acquisition and control of private
water rights is not specifically granted to the federal government
by the Constitution of the United States, power to control such
water rights is reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.1 1 s
This doctrine has been applied consistently by the United States
Supreme Court.119 In effect, the only limits placed on the state
in such regulation are the limits of consitutional rquirements such
as equal protection and due process1 20 as well as controls resulting
from the delegation by the United States Constitution of certain
powers to the federal government.'
2'
The focus of this part of the article will be on the various
interests in waters within North Dakota that belong to the people
of North Dakota and are controlled by the state government on the
people's behalf. Public rights in the waters within North Dakota
must be examined from three aspects or bases. First, the admin-
istration of the waters within the state by the State Engineer or
the State Water Commission for the public benefit; second, the
acquisition by various public agencies of water use permits for
specific public purposes; and third, the common law right of the
public to use the waters in common for navigation, fishing, hunting,
swimming, boating, and similar activities.
Any meaningful discussion of public rights in North Dakota wa-
ters must begin with the North Dakota Constitution which provides:
118. Larson, supra note 4, at 245.
119. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935)
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
120. See Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 163, 69 N.W. 570 (1896).
121. See generally Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFsA4iO L. REV.
399 (1961) ; Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L.
REV. 626 (1956).
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"All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall forever remain
the property of the state for mining, irrigating, and manufacturing
purposes." 12 22 The Supreme Court of North Dakota has interpreted
this clause as having the effect of maintaining the integrity of
the waters of the state beyond the control of individual owners
and providing for the exercise of state sovereignty if the need should
arise to protect the waters of the state.
123
Several questions arise concerning this provision. First, does
it mean that flowing streams may not be used for domestic and
livestock purposes? The answer should be a clear no. The language
is taken from the Desert Land Act of 1877.124 It certainly was not
the intent of that Act to prevent the acquisition of water for domestic
and livestock use.1 25 Quite the contrary, the intent was to preserve
the excess water after those uses to these other public benefits.
The Constitutional provision should be interpreted as making it clear
that mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes are all beneficial
uses for public water, and not interpreted for purposes of excluding
other uses.
Second, is the grant of perpetual use permits of flowing waters
by the State to private parties consistent with the admonition that
those flowing streams "remain the property of the state"? It is
difficult to see how the waters could be used practically for these
purposes without granting use permits to private parties, and in
order to make the use practical the duration should be long enough
that any permittee should be able to realize a fair return on any
investment made in commencing the use. It remains questionable,
however, whether perpetual use permits are justified; certainly they
are not required by the Constitutional provision. In exercising auth-
ority, the State Engineer should be attuned to balancing the present
private interests against future public needs.
Third, is the state permitted to favor one of the three designated
uses over the others? North Dakota's present priority statute places
both irrigation and industry in the same category level. 26 Apparently
mining is included within the term "industry."
Turning then to the North Dakota Code, the relevant provision
previously discussed specifies that "all waters within the limits
122. N.D. CONST., art. 17, § 210.
123. Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570, 573 (1896). Of. Larson, supra note 4,
at 260 n.101.
124. "[All surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with
the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and
not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public
for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights." Desert Land
Act, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
125. The Desert Land Act, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (allows water "necessarily used for the
purpose of irrigation and reclamation.")
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1(3) (Supp. 1973).
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of the state, ' 127 save for two exceptions, "belong to the public and
are subject to appropriation for beneficial use. ' 128 Thus, as also
previously discussed, private rights may be acquired in North Dakota
waters. 12 Once these private rights are obtained, they will in all
probability constitute property, and the state is prohibited from
depriving anyone of property except by due process of law.130 Also,
however, no permits for appropiation are to be granted by the
State Engineer if in his opinion it is against "the public interest"
to do so. s1
The North Dakota legislative assembly provided for the estab-
lishment of the State Conservation Commission and charged it with
almost total responsibility for management, conservation, and de-
velopment of the waters of the state.
The Commission is delegated the functions of (1) investigating,
(2) constructing, (3) maintaining, (4) regulating, (5) supervising,
and (6) controlling any system of works concerning: (1) conserva-
tion and control of waters (a) public or private, (b) navigable
or non-navigable, and (c) surface or subsurface; (2) control of
floods; and (3) regulation of water pollution.3 2 The Commission
as created is a public corporation with the power to contract in its
own name as well as hold and dispose of property. 133
Among the specific powers granted to the Commission are the
power to impound water and control and regulate flood flow. Under
the flood control power the Commission is granted authority to
conserve and develop waters within a watershed, or remove waters
from a watershed, subject to vested water rights within the water-
shed.' "
The powers of the Commission also permit it to establish regula-
tions regarding (1) sale of waters and water rights, (2) pollution
control, and (3) financing of water development projects.13 5 It is
also empowered to sell, lease, or otherwise distribute any waters
that are developed or impounded under its authority. 3 6 In conjunction
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
128. Id. A perusal of the varied uses of the terms "public" and "state" (see, e.g., 35
Words and Phrases 27-30; 40 Words and Phrases 17-19) strongly suggests that "the prop-
erty of the state" language in N.D. CONST., art. 17, § 210, and the "belong to the public"
language in N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960), are equivalents. In this context "public"
would mean "the whole body politic, or all the citizens of the state," 35 Words and Phrases
80, and "state" would mean "the whole people united in one body politic," 40 Words and
Phrases 17.
129. See text accompanying notes 59-107, supra.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-07 (1960) (discussed at note 72, supra).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-01 (1960).
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-09 (1960).
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-14(ld) (Supp. 1973).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-14(2) (Supp. 1973). This may be the approprlate time for
the commission to undertake a study of a charge system for private user of public waters.
It is difficult to find justification for free users regardless of amount.
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-14(4) (1960).
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with its power, the Commission is given authority to condemn any
property necessary for its operation. The statutory authority for
condemnation provides that riparian rights may be condemned with-
out the necessity of condemning the land as well, thus severing
the riparian water rights from the land.187 The statute implies that
the authority shall extend to all waters, intrastate, interstate, or
international.
In determining the scope of public interest in the waters located
within the state, attention must be focused upon the right of the
state to take waters for a public purpose and to cancel water
rights and return them to the public domain. The question of taking
used or unused riparian rights was discussed earlier in connection
with private ownership of waters. The focus in this discussion is
on state revocation of water permits. Clearly, the state can condemn
appropriated water rights by means of an eminent domain proceed-
ing.138 The issue of the revocation of permits for unused water rights
presented a difficult problem for many years ignored by the legis-
lative assembly.
The procedure for issuing water permits involves a review and
investigation of every permit application as to the quantity of water
available for appropriation. A problem faced by the State Engineer
is that of determining the amount of water actually used on a
given stream as opposed to the amount authorized for use by permit.
Since water permits are issued for an indefinite duration, and since
there is no requirement that the State be informed when a use
ceases or decreases, it would be possible for a stream or other
body of water to be fully appropriated on paper, but under appro-
priated in actual use. Thus a need exists for a procedure to cancel
permitted but unused water rights.13
The 1963 Legislative Assembly responded to the need by enacting
a statute providing for the forfeiture of water rights on the basis
of nonuse. 4 0 This statute specified that if an appropriated right
was not used for three successive years, provided that water was
available and that the nonuse was not due to "a justifiable inability
to complete the works, or other good and sufficient cause," it ceased
to exist. The statute further provided that the State Engineer could,
after notice and hearing, declare such water permit or right "for-
feited and cancelled." The State Engineer's authority to clear the
record extended to water rights that had never been used as well
as to those that had ceased to be used. In 1965 the law was amended
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-2? (1960).
198. Id.
139. 13 BIENNIAL REPORT OF N.D. WATER CONSERVATION CoMM. 135 (1962).
140. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 419 §§ 3-6 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-23 to -26 (Supp.
1978).
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so that the right did not automatically cease after three successive
years nonuse; it would require affirmative action by the State En-
gineer.141 In 1969 the law was again amended to exclude from the
State Engineer's power to declare forfeited the water rights of state
agencies, departments, boards, commissions, or institutions.142 These
now can be declared forfeited only by the legislative assembly.14 3
The statute appears to give the State Engineer substantial dis-
cretion in determining what is sufficient cause for nonforfeiture. 144
One question that arises is whether a three-year successive period
of nonuse, followed by a continuous period of use could leave the
water right subject to forfeiture, since there appears to be no statute
of limitations, and since the forfeiture is no longer automatic. Other
water permittees from the same supply, or applicants for water
rights therein, and "interested parties" may request the State Engi-
neer to begin forfeiture proceedings,' 4 5 and if he refuses they may
appeal his decision to the district court.
As an overall policy, it is desirable to have a procedure whereby
unused water rights can be cancelled. This facilitates maximum
use of the waters within the state, especially when water is in
short supply. Furthermore, it is difficult to plan water programs
without knowing the total amount of unused water on any given
stream or in any particular body of water. If a system of charges
could be set up on the basis of axnount used and a metering system
introduced, it might encourage less consumption and better data
collection.
Since the Commission is a public corporation, it has authority
to acquire and sell water rights in irrigation projects as well as
to assert possession over the corpus of the waters of irrigation projects
that it controls.1 46 At the same time the Commission has authority
to control use of any unappropriated waters in the state. 47 A unique
aspect of the Commission is that it may acquire water rights merely
by filing a declaration of intention,14s as well as by complying with
the regular permit requirements. The specific Code reference is
to an intention "to store, divert, or control the unappropriated waters
of a particular body, stream, basin, or source' '1 49 together with
some specified details as to proposd use. There is no provision
that the use has to be made within any specified time; it vests
141. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 447 §§ 11-12 (1965).
142. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 544 (1969).
143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-23 (Supp. 1973).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-23 through -26 (Supp. 1973).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-24 (Supp. 1973).
146. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-28 (Supp. 1973).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-29 (1960).
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-30 (Supp. 1973).
149. Id.
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when the declaration is filed and has priority from that date. 5 '
Thereafter the State Engineer can approve water rights therein Only
with the consent of the Commission.15 1 The Commission can thereby,
in effect, withdraw waters from private appropriation and reserve
them for a public purpose.
It has been pointed out previously that the State Engineer can
deny a water permit that he considers not in th:e public interest. 52
For example ,North Dakota will soon find itself in a position where
almost all of its once free-flowing streams will be either dammed
or channelized. When a permit request comes to the State Engineer
seeking to dam or channelize one of the last remaining such streams,
he might well deny the permit on the basis that it is not in the
public interest to dam further even though water is available and
even though the water dammed would be put to beneficial use.
Thus, between the Commission and the State Engineer they are
to manage, conserve, and develop the public waters of the state
for the public good subject to appropriation of the waters for bene-
ficial use. What if they fail to do so? Are they subject to action
by the public for violating a public trust? This is an important
question that is raised but not discussed in this article. The public
trust doctrine has been explored extensively in other jurisdictions. 53
In passing it has been noted that other state agencies are entitled
to obtain water permits and thereby pribrities to water use for
public purposes. Thus the North Dakota State Game and Fish De-
partment has obtained numerous permits for wildlife and recrea-
tional purposes. 5 4 The Code specifically recognizes "fish, wildlife,
and other outdoor recreational uses"'15 5 as beneficial uses, and with
the increased understanding of the interdependence of all living
things, the necessity for fish and wildlife uses may be more broadly
understood than ever before. 56 However, the Code specifies these
uses as the lowest in a four category level classification."57 In this
classification system seemingly all industrial uses are placed ahead
of any fish, wildlife, or recreational use. Such a classification system
does not seem desirable particularly in view of the increase in
environmental understanding. A strong argument can be made that
there are areas of North Dakota where fish and wildlife, for example,
should have a high or the highest classification level. In the Devils
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See discussions at notes 72 and 131, supra.
153. For a comprehensive general discussion see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Na-
tural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicE. L. REv. 473 (1970).
154. See, e.g., Permit Nos. 1399, 1470, 1493, and 1562 for the 1966-1968 period.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1(4) (Supp. 1978).
156. See Beck, A Survey of North Dakota Environmental Law, 49 N.D. L. Rxv. 1 (1972).
157. Category one is domestic use; category two is livestock use; and category three is
irrigation and industry. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (Supp. 1973).
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Lake country, for example, North Dakota has one of the few areas
in the United States uniquely suited to raising a variety of water-
fowl. 158 Arguably, North Dakota should recognize its uniqueness in
this respect and give it a higher priority than it does at the present
time.
To what extent do the public have rights to use the surface
of the waters in North Dakota? While the Code provides for water
permits for wildlife and recreational purposes, it is clear that the
focus of these permits is for erection of works or diversions for
this purpose or for maintaining the water necessary for these pur-
poses. It does not follow that a permit is needed, for example,
to boat on public waters. There may, of course, be certain public
waters that have been collected by an expensive structure for which
it is feasible to collect boating fees to help pay for part of the
structure. However, this has not been a general approach.
In the absence of any controlling North Dakota authority on
this question, the key should be a recent pronouncement of the
Wyoming Supreme Court:
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or channel of waters,
and irrespective of their navigability, the public has the right
to use public waters of this state for floating usable craft
and that use may not be interfered with or curtailed by the
landowner. It is also the right of the public while so lawfully
floating in the state's waters to lawfully hunt or fish or do
any and all other things which are not otherwise made un-
lawful.159
Clearly this should apply to navigable waters for navigation purposes
and all uses such as hunting, fishing, boating, canoeing, water skiing,
swimming, scuba diving, and any other similar type use that may
exist. But as the Wyoming Court points out if the waters are public,
and they are in North Dakota, then the result ought to follow on
that fact alone. And particularly on navigable streams the public
should be protected in the use of the banks, bed, and foreshore
as well on the theory that such use is incidental to the use of
the waters.
Thus, the public would have common rights in the surface of the
waters. While there may be still some riparian control over use of
waters in this state, it is undoubtedly minimal, so there is no effort in
this article to discuss the relative rights of riparian owners to control
the surface use of waters.L6
168. See North Dakota State Water Commission, North Dakota Interim State Water Re-
sources Development Plan, Appendix E, The North Dakota Wetlands Problem (1968).
159. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961).
fication Act and the Need for a Comprehenaive Weather Modification Program, 45 N.D.L.
(1960).
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Because these waters are public and because the public may have
a common right to use of the surface, it does not mean that the pub-
lic will always have access thereto.161 Such public rights do not en-
title members of the public to trespass over private land in order to
exercise such rights.
Two other areas of public use relative to waters of the state
should be noted. For many years it has been a more or less common
assumption that there was a public right to pollute the waters of this
and other states. 16 2 Numerous municipalities and industrial concerns
as well as many private individuals would dispose of raw sewage
and other refuse into public waters, particularly streams. This dis-
position was true in North Dakota, 63 as well as elsewhere. Now with
the advent of comprehensive state and federal water pollution con-
trol laws" much of that process has been stopped, and it can no longer
be viewed as a public right if it ever was. However, it is still permiss-
ible to use public waters as a waste disposal system if one first ob-
tains a permit to do so from the appropriate agency. 65 At the present
time, that is the Federal Environmental Protection Agency, al-
though this function will soon be turned over to the North Dakota
State Health Department. Perhaps refuse disposal permits should
have been examined in the private rights section of this article. Re-
gardless, this is one use of public water that is not regulated directly
either by the State Water Commission or the State Engineer. 6 "
Also, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly has declared: "The
state of North Dakota claims its sovereign right to use the moisture
contained in the clouds and atmosphere within the sovereign state
boundaries. 1 76 Despite the direct relationship between weather modi-
fication programs and water, administration of such programs is
vested in the State Aeronautics Commission rather than the State
Water Commission.168 While it is understandable that the Aeronau-
161. Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water,
in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGITS 177, 221-22 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
162. Occasionally there would be a common law nuisance action or one based, on riparian
rights challenging alleged pollution, such as Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3
N.W.2d 241 (1942), and Kinnischtyke v. City of Glen Ullin, 79 N.D. 495, 57 N.W.2d 588
(1953).
163. As late as January 1, 1970, the cities of Kenmare, Stanton, and Washburn were
listed by the North Dakota State Health Department as having no municipal waste treat-
ment, and the same publication contained a full page listing of treatment needs in North
Dakota. North Dakota State Department of Health, Water Quality Standards and Plan for
Implementation and Enforcement of the Standards (1970).
164. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) as amended, 33 U.S.C.§ 1151 (1970), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Sunp. II 1972) ; N.D. CENT. COPE ch. 61-28 (Supp. 1973).
165. Title IV of the 1972 amendments to the federal law sets up this system. Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. (1972).
166. Water pollution is within the Jurisdiction of the Commission, N.D. CENT. CODE .861-02-01; 61-02-14(1) (f); 61-02-14(2) (c) (1960), but the Code provides that the Health
Department is not to be deprived of authority thereby. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-15 (1960).
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-07-01 (Supp. 1973).
168. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 2-07 (Supp. 1973). See Note, The North Dakota Weather Modi-
fication Act and the Need for a Comprehensive Weather Modification Program, 45 N.D.L.
REv. 407 (1969).
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tics Commission should have a role to play, it is difficult to justify
its primary responsibility and the exclusion of the State Water Com-
mission.
IV. FEDERAL RIGHTS
In considering the question of federal ownership and control over
waters within the State of North Dakota, it is necessary to consider
three different relationships: (1) the federal government as land-
owner; (2) the federal government as possessor of certain constitu-
tional regulatory powers; and (3) the federal government as water
permit owner. Before beginning this analysis, however, certain basic
points should be made in relation to some important questions about
the water flowing in the Missouri River or stored behind the var-
ious Missouri dams. Does the federal government own the water in
the Missouri River? In only three aspects may it have any owner-
ship rights: (1) as permit holder from the state, it might like
other permit holders have a property interest in the water-an owner-
ship interest in a sense but even this is unlikely; (2) as trustee for
certain Indian tribes to the extent of their interest in the Missouri
River waters; and (3) as landowner to whatever extent riparian
rights remain. Does the federal government have the power to allo-
cate the waters of the Missouri River among the several abutting
states, even contra to the wishes of these states? The answer is: Pro-
bably yes. Has the federal government (through Congress) exercised
that power? The answer is: Probably no. That the appropriate an-
swers have been given to the foregoing questions should appear from
the following discussion.
In the most recent treatise on water and water rights, 169 the au-
thor of the chapter on Federal-State rights in discussing the case of
Arizona v. California observes:
In other words, the power of the United States over navi-
gable streams, is so complete that in reality, if not in legal
contemplation, the United States can deal with such streams
as though it 'owned' them. It can take over the entire stream-
flow, dam it and distribute it interstate and intrastate under
its own allocation scheme and in disregard of state law.170
This appears to be what the United States can do, but the ques-
tion remains: Has it done so? Has the United States dealt with the
Missouri River so as to "take over the entire streamflow, dam it
and distribute it interstate and intrastate under its own allocation
169. WATERS & WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark ed. 1967).
170. E. Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations, in 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 1,
69 (R. Clark ed. 1967) (emphasis added).
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scheme"? This difference between the existence of power and its
exercise is fundamental and was stated clearly by the United States
Supreme Court in one of the early cases on state versus federal
water rights:
It is true there have been frequent decisions recognizing the
power of the State, in the absence of Congressional legis-
lation, to assume control of even navigable waters within its
limits to the extent of creating dams, booms, bridges and other
-matters which operate as obstructions to navigability. The
power of the State to thus legislate for the interests of its
own citizens is conceded, and until in some way Congress as-
serts its superior power, and the necessity of preserving the
general interests of the people of all states, it is assumed that
state action, although involving temporarily an obstruction
to the free navigability of a stream, is not subject to chal-
lenge.
17 1
In answering the question whether the federal government has
exercised its full authority over the Missouri, the key is found in
Arizona v. California,172 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1963, where the Court found just such an exercise of power by the
United States over that portion of the waters of the Colorado River
allocated to the lower Colorado basin states. It is, therefore most
useful to begin with an extensive analysis of that case. However, even
in that case three justices thought that the United States had not
exercised its power.1 73 The majority found:
The legislative history, the language of ihe Act, and the scheme
established by the Act for the storage and delivery of water
convince us also that Congress intended to provide its own
method for a complete apportionment of the mainstream water
among Arizona, California, and Nevada.1
74
Thus the majority focused on three elements to reach its final con-
clusion. An examination of the legislative history of federal legislation
relating to the Missouri River is beyond the scope of this study. With
respect to the language of the Act, the Majority observed:
These several provisions, even without legislative history,
are persuasive that Congress intended the Secretary of the
Interior, through his § 5 contracts, both to carry out the alloca-
tion of the waters of the main Colorado River among the
Lower Basin States and to decide which users within each
State would get waters.
7 5
171. United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
172. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). decree entered 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
173. Mr. Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart.
174. 373 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
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What then were "These provisions"? The Court discussed them as
follows:
In the first section of the Act, the Secretary was authorized
to 'construct, operate, and maintain a dam and incidental
works . . . adequate to create a storage reservoir of a capa-
city of not less than twenty million acre-feet of water . . . '
for the stated purpose of 'controlling the floods, improving
navigation and regulating the flow of the Colorado River,
providing for storage and for the delivery of the stored waters
thereof for reclamation of public lands and other beneficial
uses .. . ' and generating electrical power. The whole point
of the Act was to replace the erratic, undependable, often
destructive natural flow of the Colorado with the regular,
dependable release of waters conserved and stored by the
project. Having undertaken this beneficial project, Congress,
in several provisions of the Act, made it clear that no one
should use mainstream waters save in strict compliance with
the scheme set up by the Act. Section 5 authorized the Secre-
tary 'under such general regulations as he may prescribe to
contract for the storage of water in said reservoir and for
the delivery thereof at such points on the river . . . as may
be agree upon, for irrigation and domestic uses . . . .' To
emphasize that water could be obtained from the Secretary
alone, § 5 further declared, 'No person shall have or be en-
titled to have the use for any purpose of the water stored
as aforesaid except by contract made as herein stated.' The
supremacy given the Secretary's contracts was made clear
in § 8 (b) of the Act, which provided that, while the Lower
Basin States were free to negotiate a compact dividing the
waters, such a compact if made and approved after January
1, 1929, was to be 'subject to all contracts, if any, made by
the Secretary of the Interior under section 5' before Congress
approved the compact.
17
The three dissenting justices argued that these provisions did
not show such a complete exercise of federal power in view of § 18 of
the Project Act:
Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such
rights as the States now have either to the waters within
their borders or to adopt such policies and enact such laws
as they may deem necessary with respect to the appropria-
tion, control, and use of waters within their borders .... 177
The majority replied that section 18 merely allows the States to do
things not inconsistent with the federal project such as regulating
use of tributary waters and protecting present perfected rights.
176. Id. at 579-80.
177. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
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As to the third point, "the scheme established" by the federal
legislation, the majority stated:
Before the Project Act was passed, the waters of the Colorado
River, though numbered by the millions of acre-feet, flowed
too haltingly or too freely, resulting in droughts and floods.
The problems caused by these conditions proved too im-
mense and the solutions too costly for any one State or all the
States together. In addition, the States, despite repeated
efforts at a settlement, were unable to agree on how much
water each State should get. With the health and growth of
the Lower Basin at stake, Congress responded to the pleas
of the States to come to their aid. The result was the Pro-
ject Act and the harnessing of the bountiful waters of the
Colorado to sustain growing cities, to support expanding
industries, and to transform dry and barren deserts into
lands that are livable and productive.
In undertaking this ambitious and expensive project for the
welfare of the people of the Lower Basin States and of the
Nation, the United States assumed the responsibility for the
construction, operation, and supervision of Boulder Dam
and a great complex of other dams and works. Behind the
dam were stored virtually all the waters of the main river,
thus impounding not only the natural flow but also the
great quantities of water previously allowed to run waste
or to wreak destruction. The impounding of these waters,
along with their regulated and systematic release to those
with contracts, has promoted the spectacular development
of the Lower Basin. Today, the United States operates a
whole network of useful projects up and down the river, in-
cluding the Hoover Dam, Davis Dam, Parker Dam, Headgate
Rock Dam, Palo Verde Dam, Imperial Dam, Laguna Dam,
Morelos Dam, and the All-American Canal System, and
many lesser works. It was only natural that the United
States, which was to make the benefits available and which
had accepted the responsibility for the project's operation,
would want to make certain that the waters were effectively
used. All this vast, interlocking machinery-a dozen major
works delivering water according to congressionally fixed
priorities for home, agricultural, and industrial uses to peo-
ple spread over thousands of square miles-could function
efficiently only under unitary management, able to formu-
late and supervise a coordinated plan that could take account
of the diverse, often conflicting interests of the people and
communities of the Lower Basin States. Recognizing this,
Congress put the Secretary of the Interior in charge of these
works and entrusted him with sufficient power, principally
the § 5 contract power, to direct, manage, and coordinate
their operation. Subjecting the Secretary to the varying,
possibly inconsistent, commands of the different state legis-
latures could frustrate efficient operation of the project and
thwart full realization of the benefits Congress intended
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this national project to bestow. We are satisfied that the Secre-
tary's power must be construed to permit him, within the
boundaries set down in the Act, to allocate and distribute
the waters of the mainstream of the Colorado River.
78
A complete comparative review of the legislative history, the
law itself, and the federal scheme for the Missouri River Basin with
-those of the Boulder Canyon Project is a mammoth undertaking and
well beyond the scope of this study. 179 However, that is what must
be done to best understand whether Congress has exercised the
federal power as completely over the Missouri River as it did over
the Colorado, since nowhere in the Missouri River legislation does
Congress clearly state that allocations of water among and within
the several states are to be made by some department of the federal
government. However, several points are clear without such an exten-
sive analysis. First, the Boulder Canyon Project Act was clearly
intended to be an apportionment Act; section 4 thereof in its en-
tirety deals with "the Colorado River compact" and the question
of how to make a basic apportionment of waters among certain
of the states.180 Thus the issue to which all of the quoted material
relates as indicated in the first excerpt is whether Congress intended
a complete apportionment scheme when it was clearly dealing
with a partial apportionment scheme in section 4. The answer the
majority gave was "yes" based on the foregoing analysis. Nowhere
in the Missouri River Basin legislation is there such a clear par-
tial apportionment scheme which by later general language could
be expanded into a "complete" scheme. 81 Second, four of the jus-
tices involved in Arizona v. California are still on the bench,'
18 2 two
of whom thought the federal power had been exercised, two of whom
did not. If recent trends in other areas are any indication,
18 3 the
present court requires a clear indication of federal pre-emption and
on an ambiguous fact situation, the better position is against pre-
emption. Third, nowhere in the Missouri River legislation is there
a provision as strong as section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
8 "
In fact in the 1965 Act dealing with the Garrison diversion unit, the
178. 373 U.S. at 588-90 (emphasis added).
179. GAaaiSON DIVERSION UNIT, H.R. Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), alone is
230 pages in length.
180. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 § 4 (1928).
181. "The Garrison diversion unit as proposed in the report is a modification of the Mis-
souri-Souris unit which was authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1944 for construction
as an initial unit of the Missouri River Basin Project." GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT, H.R.
Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. iii (1960).
182. Mr. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and White.
183. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways/Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). For a
recent review of pre-emption law, see Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515. Cf. Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
(Douglas & Stewart, JJ, dissenting); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1978).
184. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1060 (1928).
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Congress found it necessary to specifically legislate: "the Secretary
is authorized . . . (iii) to allocate water and reservoir capacity to
recreation or fish and wildlife use .... ,"185
Furthermore, in the Missouri River legislation there exists a
provision frequently referred to as the Milliken-O'Mahoney amend-
ment. That section provides as follows:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation
and maintenance of such works herein authorized for con-
struction, of waters arising in States lying wholly or partly
west of the ninety-eighth meridian shall be only such use as
does not conflict with any beneficial consumptive use, pre-
sent or future, in States lying wholly or partly west of the
ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for domestic, mun-
icipal, stock water, irrigation, mining, or industrial pur-
poses.1
8 6
Apparently Congress has subordinated navigation and the federal
government's otherwise superior navigation easement to the listed
uses. However, this provision is silent as to recreation and wildlife
uses 187 and power generation use.1 8 The only difficult provision in
terms of seeming to endorse expansive federal powers reads as
follows:
SEC. 6. That the Secretary of War is authorized to make
contracts with States, municipalities, private concerns, or
individuals, at such prices and on such terms as he may
deem reasonable, for domestic and industrial uses for sur-
plus water that may be available at any reservoir under the
control of the War Department: PROVIDED, That no con-
tracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing
lawful uses of such water. All moneys received from such con-
tracts shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States
as miscellaneous receipts. 18 9
What does "surplus water" mean in this context? One argument
is that it refers to "flood waters" that are accumulated behind the
respective dams. 90 The Act after all was a flood control act,"" how-
185. 79 Stat. 433 (1965).
186. 58 Stat. 889 (1944). See GARRTSON DIVERSION UNIT 47, H.R. Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
187. For contrast see text accompanying note 185, supra.
188. Power generation is mentioned as an aspect of the Garrison Diversion Project, par-
ticularly as a basis for recouping some of the costs. See GARIsON DrvERsioq UNIT 83, IR.
Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
189. 58 Stat. 890 (1944).
190. See 1944 U.S. CoD CONG. SEsv. 1354: "and, where practicable, of conserving the
flood waters for beneficial uses." See also 2 U.S. C.C. & A.N. 1488 (1952) : "The Corps of
Engineers has no title to the surplus water which may be Impounded by these dams."
191. See 58 Stat. 887 (1944), where in the preamble it is asserted: "It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the Congress to recognize the interests and rights of the States in de-
termining the development of the watersheds within their borders and likewise their in-
terests and rights in water utilization and control .... "
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ever, not only designed to reduce flooding, but also to allow those
waters that would otherwise be wasted through flooding to be put
to beneficial use. Since the federal government was going to save
these flood waters through its construction efforts, it appears only
reasonable that it would be given some control over those waters. It
certainly was not intended that this provision would authorize the
Secretary of War to dispose of any and all water not necessary for
some other federal purpose. 19 2 If these waters are all eventually re-
leased downstream, then, of course, there is no surplus at all to
dispose of.
Another interpretation is that surplus refers to all water not ne-
cessary for the primary purpose of the reservoir such as irrigation. 19
But whichever meaning is assigned to "surplus," the section
does not state that the Secretary of War may disregard State wishes
as to the use of the water. It merely gives him the authority to set (1)
prices and (2) terms and nothing more. "Terms" in all probability
relates to the terms under which the price is to be paid and does
not establish any control as to usage. Since the Corps of Engineers
has constructed the facility and must to some extent manage it, it
seems reasonable for them to recoup some of the costs through with-
drawal charges.
Fourth, the history and conditions of the Missouri River Basin
are not like those of the Colorado River Basin. There have been no
long-standing controversies among the Missouri Basin States over
allocation of the waters in the Missouri with repeated attempts at
solution that have failed, and while the States have requested fed-
eral assistance for numerous projects, and continue to do so, 9 4 these
projects, while arguably giving an economic lift to the Basin, have
not been essential to the continued economic viability of the region.
Furthermore, independent state action in no way threatens the
viability of the federal projects. So vast differences do indeed exist.
To argue that Congress stepped in to divide the waters of the Mis-
souri at a time when the States had not even made an attempt to
192. For that would have appropriated to the United States for allocation the water not
only in the Missouri River but many other streams that the Flood Control Act of 1944 dealt
with.
193. The Federal Power Commission has used the following definition of "Surplus wa-
ters":
Where there Is available stored water not to be used in irrigation, which rep-
resents storage over and above that needed for irrigation, and which would
otherwise flow unused down the main channel of the stream, that water is
'surplus water'....
Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
194. See the interesting "history of water resource development" in North Dakota State
Water Commission, North Dakota Interim State Water Resources Development Plan 16-21
(1968). Recent efforts in North Dakota have been directed toward getting assistance for
bank stabilization. See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 30, 1974, at 29, col. 8: "Bank ero-
sion control sought," discussing the prospects for demonstration projects to stabilize the
Missouri River banks.
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do so and under circumstances when it was not essential to the via-
bility of the federal project .simply does not comport with Arizona
v. California.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear in the past
that the federal government does not assume ownership over water
merely through the construction of a federal project. In Nebraska
v. Wyoming it observed:
The property right in the water right is separate and dis-
tinct from the property right in the reservoirs, ditches, or
canals. The water right is appurtenant to the land, the owner
of which is the appropriator. The water right is acquired by
perfecting an appropriation, i.e., by an actual diversion fol-
lowed by an application within a reasonable time of the water
to a beneficial use.' 95
The Court found it unnecessary, however, to determine the fed-
eral claim to unappropriated water since the government had follow-
ed the Reclamation Law of 1902 and applied to the states for water
permits.
That Congress has not exercised the complete federal power
over the waters in the Missouri River does rot mean that it has
not exercised any power. Quite the contrary, it has exercised a
substantial power, 9" the true nature and extent of which can be
determined only by an exhaustive analysis of the complete legis-
lative history and legislative documents pertaining to the River.
Before proceeding any further with the traditional analysis of
federal power, it seems appropriate to deal with a nontraditional
issue. When North Dakota formulated its constitution for admission
to statehood, it included therein the provision mentioned earlier
in the discussion of private and public rights: "All flowing streams
and natural watercourses shall forever remain the property of the
state for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes."' 97
When Congress admitted North Dakota into the Union did it
enter into a "binding compact" with North Dakota that ceded to
North Dakota any proprietary rights the federal government had
in the waters thereof? 98 How could the language be more clear
than "shall forever remain the property of the state"? Only Wyoming
among the other states had a similar provision in its constitution
195. 325 U.S. 589, 614 (1945).
196. See, e.g., GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT, H.R. Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)
79 Stat. 433 (1965). Thus, we have three federal agencies directly involved: The Corps of
Engineers as builder and manager of basic structures, the Bureau of Reclamation as irri-
gation overseer, and the Federal Power Commission as power development licensor.
197. N.D. CONST. art. 17, § 210. See discussion accompanying note 21, supra.
198. For a general discussion of this binding compact theory as it relates to water rights,
see E. Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations, In 2 WATERS & WATER RIOHTS 71-76
(R. Clark ed. 1967).
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upon admission.19 While the United States Supreme Court has from
time to time referred to a "compact" between the newly admitted
state and the federal government, 20 0 it has never come close to
a holding on the question here involved. 201 The most substantial
problem with the compact theory is the language of the constitutional
provision. In the North Dakota Constitution the reference is to "the
property of the state," but was that meant to contrast with private
riparian ownership or to contrast with federal ownership? The Wyo-
ming Supreme Court has found such a compact to exist, and in
their view it is "unalterable and obligatory."
20 2
One area in which the federal government has exercised exclu-
sive control on navigable waters is for licensing of power projects.
In First Iowa Coop. v. FPC,20° the United States Supreme Court
found that the federal government had exercised its primary juris-
diction and that Iowa could not interfere by requiring an Iowa
license or permit as well. The Court stated that the Federal Power
Act involved the exercise of three different constitutional powers:
(1) that to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, (2) that to
administer the public lands and reservations, and (3) that to exer-
cise authority under the treaties of the United States. The Court
believed that the saving clause in Section 27 of the Federal Power
Act supported its conclusion:
Sec. 27. That nothing hereincontained shall be construed as
affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with
the laws of the respective States relating to the control, ap-
propriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation
or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein.
20 4
Thus, the federal government now controls power licensing pursuant
to the Federal Power Act whereas "irrigation or for municipal
or other [similar] uses" are left to the State jurisdiction.
In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon20 5 this exclusive power
licensing function was extended to federal "reservations." The First
Iowa case did not control in Oregon since the Deschutes River
in Oregon was a nonnavigable river. The Court found the regulation
here to be within the scope of the property clause of the United
States Constitution and applied the exclusivity feature of First Iowa.
The argument that the Desert Land Act required Oregon's consent
199. Id. at 71.
200. Id. at 81.
201. Id.
202. Merrill v. Bishop, 287 P.2d 620, 625 (Wyo. 1955).
203. 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
204. Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1077, 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1970).
205. 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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was dismissed with the observations (1) that it applied only to
"public lands" whereas the lands here involved were "reservations,"
and (2) that general statutes regarding disposal of lands did not
apply to lands not available for disposal. 20 6 Justice Douglas in dissent
foresaw an unhappy future. He believed that presidential withdraw-
als could not deal with water rights, otherwise:
In the West, the United States owns a vast amount of land-
in some states, over 50 per cent of all the land. If by mere
Executive action the federal lands may be reserved and all
the water rights appurtenant to them returned to the United
States, vast dislocations in the economies of the Western
States may follow.
20 7
A recent federal appeals court decision20 does raise a serious
question about the role of the Federal Power Commission in contro-
ling use of Garrison Reservoir waters. The Federal Power Commis-
sion has contended that it does not have authority under the Federal
Power Act to license thermal-electric generating plants, but in the
case, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the FPC "does
have jurisdiction to license the utilization of surplus water by ther-
mal-electric generating plants." 209
What then is the general law with reference to federal rights
assuming no pre-emption under the Arizona v. California or FPC
doctrines? Of fundamental importance is California-Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver210 decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1935. The petitioner in the case had an 1885 patent under the Home-
stead Act. He sought to enjoin the defendant from lessening the
flow over his lands on the nonnavigable Rogue River. The petitioner
had never applied any of the waters to beneficial use while the
defendant had a permit from the state engineer pursuant to the
state's appropriation laws. The petitioner claimed riparian rights.
The Court found the Desert Land Act of 1877 to be controlling
even though the petitioner's patent was issued under the Homestead
Act. Following the Desert Land Act a patent to public lands in
a desert-land state or territory, including Dakota, carried no water
right. The grantee would take only such water rights "as shall
be fixed or acknowledged by the customs, laws, and judicial de-
cisions of the state of their location." 211 What in effect the Desert
206. Id. at 448.
207. Id. at 457.
208. Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1973). At this writing an appeal
is pending to the United States Supreme Court.
209. Id. at 1242. The court relied on the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970):
"To issue licenses . . . for the purpose of utilizing the surplus water or water power from
any Government dam .... "
210. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
211. Id. at 162.
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Land Act had done was to sever from the land "the waters of
all lakes, rivers and other sources of water upon the public lands
and not navigable ' 2 12 and not previously appropriated to remain
"free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes. ' 21 This policy of general state
control was. continued in the Reclamation Act of 1902 and amend-
ments thereto in 1906 and 1909.21
1
4
Prior to 1877 apparently riparian rights did attach to convey-
ances of public lands, and such rights were entitled to some consti-
tutional protection.
215
Having dealt with several aspects of the immediate issue of
the status of the Missouri River, which has introduced questions
concerning the power of the federal government over its property
and the scope of its commerce power, including control over navi-
gable waters and non-navigable waters as they affect navigable
waters, it is appropriate to turn to a discussion of each of the
three categories referred to at the beginning of this Part.
In the course of the major water law treatise chapter of federal-
state relations,2 1 6 the following sources of federal power are explor-
ed: the commerce clause and the navigation powers; 21 the property




Prior to the adnission of North Dakota to statehood in 1889,
the federal government was the largest landowner in the area west
of the Mississippi River. The question arose as the federal govern-
ment's right to waters flowing on or by the land it owned. The
United States Supreme Court ruled in 1899 that even though the
states were free to adopt the appropriation system of water rights,
212. Id. at 158.
213. Id.
214. Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390 § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1970) ; as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 759 (1970) ; 25 U.S.C. § 320 (1970).
215. E.g., Sturr v. Beck, 139 U.S. 541 (1890) (discussed at notes 17-20, supra).
216. E. Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations, in 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS
(R. Clark ed. 1967).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . .. To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ...
218. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general welfare of
the United States ... ."
220. Id.: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense . . . of the United States."
221. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2: "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . .."
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no state could impose limitations on rights of the federal government
as proprietor of public lands.2 22 The Court concluded that the doctrine
of appropriation could not act to divest the federal government
of riparian rights. This limitation on state power existed even though
the federal government had acquiesced to appropriation of water
on land it owned and to the application of the doctrine of prior
appropriation as a means of settling water disputes on federal lands.
Three early federal statutes form the basis for the federal recog-
nition and protection of the Western appropriation concept. The
earliest of these was the 1866 statute that granted rights-of-way
to ditch and canal over public lands to further mineral development
on public lands. 223 That statute contained an express provision pro-
tecting prior possessory water uses that had vested and accrued
according to local customs, laws and court decisions. 2 4 The second
federal statute was enacted in 1870 and amended the 1866 law by
making "all patents granted, or pre-emption or homesteads allowed"
subject to the vested and accrued water rights mentioned in the
previous act.225 Finally, the 1877 Desert Land Act provided that the
titles to land and non-navigable waters on the public land subject
to federal grants would be separated and rights in the water would
be determined by the appropriate territorial or state law in effect
at the time the land was transferred.2
2 6
The Supreme Court has interpreted the intention of certain of
these acts to be the separation of titles to land and non-navigable
waters riparian thereto so that future patents to land would convey
only those water rights that had been acquired in accordance with
state law.227 This rationale has been regarded as a complete surrender
222. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
223. 14 Stat. 251, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
224. Id. § 9. "See. 9. And be it further enacted, That whenever, by priority of possession,
rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes, have
vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged, by the local customs,
laws, and .he decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for, the construction of ditches
and canals for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and confirmed: Provided,
however, That whenever, after the passage of this act, any person or persons shall, in the
construction of any ditch or canal, injure or damage the possession of any settler on the
public domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall be liable to the party
injured for such injury or damage." Id. at 253.
225. 16 Stat. 218, 43 U.S.C. § 661: "See. 17. And be it further enacted, that none of the
rights conferred by sections five, eight, and nine of the act to which this act is amendatory
shall be abrogated by this act, and the same are hereby extended to all public lands affected
by this act; and all patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be sub-
ject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in
connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by the
ninth section of the act of which this act Is amendatory."
226. 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935), the United States Supreme Court held that the Act was
applicable to grants made under the homestead and pre-emption acts as well as to desert-
land entries.
227. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162, 164
(1935).
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of federal control over rights to non-navigable waters located on
lands conveyed by the federal government.
22
A contrary argument by the federal government contends that
the acts that separated water rights from federally conveyed lands
did not, however, have the effect of surrendering these rights to
the states. Under this view the government retained power to reserve
waters for its own use, the only stipulation being noninterference
with state created rights. This argument has been relevant in deter-
mining the status of water rights on lands reserved for reclamation
and power projects, particularly in the period from 1910 to 1915.
In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon 29 the United States Su-
preme Court agreed that the federal government had reserved water
rights necessary for such projects. The result of this decision was
to deny compensation to water right holders who had acquired their
rights pursuant to state law, but after the creation of the "reserved"
lands, and whose rights would be affected adversely by the federal
project development.
This case raises the question as to the scope of water rights
that the federal government has retained for its own lands. The
federal government still retains ownership of considerable acreage
that it owned at the time the western states were admitted to
the Union. 230 Would such reserved water rights apply to development




The Supreme Court indicated that waters on these reserved
lands are not subject to appropriation or other diversion in a manner
that would reduce their usefulness to federal governmental proj-
ects.2 3 2 This argument was applied to reserved lands set aside for
reclamation and power projects during the period from 1910 to 1915.
The reasoning is that in reserving the land for a particular purpose,
the government also, by implication, reserved sufficient waters on
the land to supply that purpose.
Since North Dakota began as a common law riparian state,
228. Larson, supra note 4, at 252. In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842),
the United States Supreme Court had declared the basic law as to ownership of navigable
waters. The court stated that the original colonies owned the waters of navigable streams
and the beds beneath them, and as each subsequent state was admitted to the Union, it
acquired rights comparable to those of the original colonial states subject only to the right
of the federal government to regulate use thereof under the commerce clause and other
constitutional powers..
229. Federal Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1954). See also Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), where the Court held that Indian lands had been "reserved."
230. PUBLIc LAND LAW REV. COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 3Y THE PUBLIc LAND LAW REvIEw COMMIssION 19
(1970), indicates 700 million acres. The report shows five percent of the land- area of North
Dakota to be federally owned, although it does not indicate the source of federal owner-
ship. Id. at 23.
231. Recent unpublished federal statistics show a federal claim to ownership of 5,406,683
subsurface acres in the 28 western North Dakota coal counties Or 20.3 percent of the
total area. The statistics were compiled for the Great Plains Resources Program.
232. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 849 U.S. 435 (1954),
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the argument could be made that the federal government still pos-
sesses the common law riparian rights to waters on lands that
it owns and over which it has never relinquished control whether
reserved or not. Several cases bear on this argument. 2 8
In order to fully assess the relevance of possible federal, water
rights in North Dakota, it is necessary to determine whether or
not the federal government has designated any lands as "reserved"
lands as distinguished from "public lands." Of course, the possibility
also remains for the government to designate previously undesignated
lands as "reserved" lands and, thus, cut off future water rights.
This would only apply to original public domain lands, however.
There is some question as to whether any of these federal rights
may be asserted by grantees of the federal government.2 8
4
It is now clear that state courts may adjudicate the nature
and scope of federal reserved water rights. This matter was in direct
issue before the Supreme Court of the United States in United States
v. District Court for Eagle County: 23 5 "The United States moved
to be dismissed as a party [from a Colorado adjudication proceed-
ing], asserting that 43 U.S.C. § 66626 does not constitute consent
to have adjudicated in a state court the reserved water rights of
the United States." A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the Colo-
rado Court in its refusal to dismiss the United States. North Dakota
has adjudication procedures available under its water law.23 7 Mon-
tana adjudication questions have been raised recently in a suit
filed in federal district court in Montana, 28 a partial purpose of
which is to challenge federal claims to control over waters in the
Missouri River.23 9 Perhaps the filing of the Montana law suit spurred
283. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349
U.S. 435 (1954) ; First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946) ; Califor-
nia-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) ; United States
v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 1.74 U.S. 690 (1899).
234. Broder' v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879). See also 14 Stat. 251, 253; 43 U.S.C. §
661 (1970).
235. 401 U.S. 520, 522 (1971).
236. 66 Stat. 560, 43 U.S.C.§ 666(a) (1970), provides:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant In any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, Or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when
a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to
plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States Is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2)) shall he subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may ob-
tain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs
shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
Id.
237. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-16 to -19 (1960).
238. Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, as per the complaint available in the office
of Professor Beck at the University of North Dakota School of Law.
239. Id. at 39-40.
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the federal government into seeking a unified position on the matter
of ownership and control over Missouri River waters .240 If the con-
cerned parties do not reach a settlement then either Congress or
the courts may have to make a determination.
With reference to acquired lands, the federal government would
have only such water rights as were attached to and transferred
with the land at the time of acquisition and in thins capacity would
be like any private party.
There is factual data to support the argument that the federal
government divested itself of all water rights in favor of the states.
This data forms the basis for the second source of federal water
rights in North Dakota, that is, water permits in favor of the federal
government which have been issued by the State Engineer after
application for a water permit had been made by a federal agency. 41
(2) Permit Holder
At present the federal government is probably the largest single
water user in North Dakota. The records of the State Water Commis-
sion are replete with water permits in favor of the federal govern-
ment. There are 284 W.P.A. permits alone. In addition to these,
there are many additional recorded water permits in favor of federal
agencies. 24 2
240. "Unified Federal Position on Water Marketing First Goal of Special Committee,"
MRB, Basin Bulletin 1 (Dec. 20, 1973).
241. It Is assumed here that the federal agency would be required to file for a water
permit under North Dakota law. In the past, however, the federal government has been
exempted from the formal filing requirements and has merely had to notify the office of
the state engineer of an intention to appropriate waters in order for those waters to be
removed from the scope of public use for appropriation. N.D. LAWS, 1905, ch. 34, § 36,
repealed N.D. LAWS, 1943, ch. 229, § 1:
Whenever the proper officers of the United States, authorized by law to con-
struct works for the utilization of waters within the state, shall notify the
state engineer that the United States intends to utilize certain specified wa-
ters, the waters so described, and unappropriated at the date of such notice,
shall not be subject to further appropriation under the laws of this state for
a period of three years from the date of said notice, at which time the proper
officers of the United States shall file plans for the proposed work in the
office of the state engineer for his information, and no adverse claim to the
use of the waters required in connection with such plans, initiated subsequent
to the date of such notice, shall be recognized under the laws of this state,
except as to such amount of the water described In such notice as may be for-
mally released In writing by an officer of the United States, thereunto duly
authorized; provided, that in case of failure to file plans of the proposed work
within three years, as herein required, the waters specified in the noticel given
by the United States to the state engineer shall become public waters, subject
to general appropriations.
Id. See also N.D. LAWS 1935, ch. 228, § 17, repealed N.D. LAWS 1957, ch. 983, § 46. In 1934
the Secretary of Agriculture had communicated the federal government's intent to utilize
unappropriated waters described as: "The Mouse River, also known as th Souris River,
and all of its tributaries; the Des Lacs River, also known as the Des Lacs Lakes, and all
of their tributaries; the James River, including its tributary the Pipestem River, and all
tributaries of both such rivers in North Dakota; the Bois de Sioux River, the Sheyenne
River, the Forest River, and all other tributaries of the Red River in North Dakota; all
tributaries of the Missouri River in North Dakota. North Dakota State Water Commission,
North Dakota Interim State Water Resources Developmen Plan 17 (1968).
242. See, e.g., S.W.P. 250, 434, 485, 466 (U.S. Bureau of Reclanaion) ; 926, 1058, 1243,
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Is the federal government legally required to file for permits
under state law? Or have these agencies merely chosen to do so
as a matter of grace in aiding the state's regulation of water use?
Clearly the federal government is required to file for permits in
conformity with applicable state law under the Reclamation Act
of 1902.243 Similar provisions exist in other federal statutes. 244 These
statutes taken together might imply that Congress did not intend
to reserve paramount water rights for the federal government. As
a practical matter, since arguments are strong on both sides of
this issue, it seems logical to consider the public policy aspects
of defeating private investment interests by the exercise of claims
that have long been dormant.
245
The final aspect of federal water rights in North Dakota to
be treated here is control over waters that results from the exercise
by the federal government of specific regulatory powers delegated
to it by the United States Constitution.
(3) Regulatory Powers
Among the relevant federal regulations are the commerce power,
the treaty-making power, and the spending power. The total result
of these powers is to remove from state control a significant amount
of authority over bodies of water that lie within North Dakota or
on its borders.
If it is determined that particular waters are navigable, it has
been the rule that the state owns the bed and the waters subject
to the right of the federal government to regulate use in order to
promote and maintain the flow of commerce. 24 (8 The commerce clause
gives the federal government the opportunity to extend its control
over waters within a state to an immense degree. The Supreme
Court has declared 247 that to the extent that private rights are
impaired by navigation improvements there is under some circum-
stances no right to redress by the injured party. The Court has
also held249 that flood protection, watershed development and so
forth, through the generation and use of electric power were all
parts of commerce control. In a special context the Court has ap-
proved 249 the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government over
navigable streams.
1259P, 1260P, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1273P, 1274P, 1339, 1361, 1362, 1481 (U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service); 1107, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1234, 1554 (U.S. Forest Service); and
1191 through 1198 (National Park Service).
243. 32 Stat. 390, § 8; 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1958).
244. See Rights of Way Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1101, 43 U.S.C. § 946 (1958); Federal
Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958).
245. See Larson, supra note 4, at 253.
246. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
247. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
248. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1940).
249. First Iowa HIydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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Under the commerce power the federal government has author-
ity to control waterways to the extent necessary to promote naviga-
tion.2 50 This control extends to tributaries of navigable waters which
are in themselves not navigable to the extent necessary to protect
navigation. 251 In theory then, federal control could extend to the
tiniest stream. The question thus presents itself as to how far and
to what extent the federal government could assert control over
nonnavigable waters on the ground that there is some effect on
navigable waters. If a small nonnavigable stream empties into a
navigable river and the nonnavigable stream is drained or dammed
by the state or by an appropriator, could it not be argued that
under some circumstances the lessening of the flow to the navigable
stream produced a detrimental effect on the flow of commerce?
Therefore, federal control could be exerted over the uses for which
the nonnavigable waters are applied on the grounds that there is
an ultimate effect produced on the navigable waterways. In light
of past Supreme Court decisions, this conclusion is a distinct pos-
sibility. This provides the federal government with a great deal
of power in North Dakota as regards the Missouri River and its
tributaries. While the issue of navigability for commerce purposes
is a federal question, the North Dakota courts have recognized
the Mouse River at Minot to be nonnavigable, 212 the Missouri River
to be navigable,253 Sweetwater Lake to be navigable,2 54 and Devils
Lake to be navigable.
25
5
It is well settled that the riparian right of access to the navigable
part of a river is property.25 6 The question then arises whether
the impairment or destruction of a riparian owner's access to a
navigable body of water, when the impairment is caused by con-
struction incident to making improvements in navigation, is taking
without compensation. The courts hold that a riparian owner is
entitled to no compensation for the cutting off of his access to
the navigable portion of the stream by work done by the govern-
ment for the improvement of navigationY.2 7 The reasons for this
result which seems initially to violate the constitution do not seem
clear, and the courts are not in agreement as to any general postu-
lates. One theory is to declare that the constitution forbids "taking"
for public use without compensation and in these cases the injury
is merely consequential and thus not a taking. 258 Other cases have
250. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
251. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
252. Bissell v. Olson, 26 N.D. 60, 143 N.W. 240 (1913).
253. Hogue v. Bourgols, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955).
254. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
255. Rutten v State, 93 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1958).
256. Park Comm'rs v. Taylor, 139 Ia. 453, 108 N.W. 927 (1906) ; Reeves v. Backus Brooks
Co., 83 Minn. 339, 86 N.W. 337 (1901).
257. Annot., 21 A.L.R. 206, 215 (1922).
258. Ird. at 216.
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stated the reason to be that since Congress has constitutional power
over commerce it may improve the navigability of water without
making compensation for the access destroyed in so doing.28 9 Some
of the cases have stated that the private right of access to the
water is not valid as against the superior right of the government
to make improvements beneficial to navigation. 260 There are some
cases that have gone so far as to allow the water to be completely
removed from the channel thus totally destroying the watercourse
as far as the riparian owner was concerned.261 The federal govern-
ment may accomplish improvement of navigation by placing struc-
tures in the bed of the stream. The cases hold that as long as
the structures improve navigation, the riparian owner will have
little or no redress.26 2
Since the federal regulatory interest is not proprietary,263 it does
not in theory contradict state ownership of water and state power
to allocate water rights, but does operate to prevent the assertion
of any ownership or allocation rights that would hinder navigation.
And since the federal interest is an "overriding servitude," injury
to private rights resulting from exercise of navigation power does
not require compensation.2 64
Most of the federal activity regarding water has been justified
on the basis of the navigation power.2 65 It was not until 1936 that
the spending power 6 received separate status generally267 and in
1950 this power was cited to justify the Central Valley Reclamation
Project in California. 26 8 The power offers a vast potential for federal
involvement and it appears to be up to Congress whether any project
authorized thereunder must comply with state laws.
2 69
The war power2 70 appears to provide the federal government
with vast potential as well, although it has been little used to date.
2 1
1
It did surface as a basis for justifying the Tennessee Valley Authority
Project.7 2 It might surface again in the energy production context
since water is an important element in most forms of energy produc-
259. Henderson v. Hines, 48 N.D. 152, 183 N.W. 531 (1921).
260. Home for Aged Women v. Corn., 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909).
261. Black River Improv. Co. v. LaCrosse Boom & Transp. Co., 54 Wis. 659, 11 N.W. 443
(1882).
262. Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, 39 F. 77 (1889).
263. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 867, 410 (1842).
264. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) See Larson, s pra
note 4, at 257.
265. See generally E. Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations, in 2 WATERS & WATE
RiGTs 1, 83-84 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
267. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
268. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1960).
269. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
271. See generally E. Morreale, supra note 265, at 85.
272. Ashwander v. TVA, 298 U.S. 288 (1936).
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tion whether electrical power generation or coal gasification. 27 8
The treaty power 2 74 will be discussed in Part VI of the article
with International and Interstate matters.
V. INDIAN RIGHTS
Due to the silence of the treaties, legislation, or executive orders
creating reservations as to the nature and scope of Indian water
rights, it has been necessary for the courts to determine to what
extent tribal water rights exist, and the nature of those rights.
Historically, Indian tribal claims to the use of water were con-
fined to hunting and fishing rights, agricultural use, and domestic
use. However, with rapidly advancing technology and a push for
development within many Indian tribes, Indian claims to water are
now made for other uses as well, such as hydroelectric power and
industrial development.
Tribal claims to fishing rights are relatively unimportant in
North Dakota275 as compared to other states, 276 so only a brief treat-
ment will be given. United States v. Winan277 was one of the earliest
cases involving tribal claims to the use of water. It involved the
rights of the Yakima tribe in Washington to establish certain fishing
sites on the Columbia River for the tribe. The Court construed
the treaty liberally in favor of the Indians on the fishing rights
issue.
Winans was followed in 1908 by a landmark case concerning
Indian water rights, Winters v. United States.27 1 The Winters case
involved the interpretation of an 1888 agreement between the United
States and the Fort Belknap Indians. This agreement reduced the
area designated to be the permanent home of the tribe. The reduced
area was bounded in part by the Milk River which had also been
a part of the original reservation land. In 1889 Montana became
a state. Since 1889 the Milk River had been diverted by the United
States so as to supply the reservation with adequate water. Up-
stream from the reservation, Winters, a non-Indian, constructed
dams that prevented the water from flowing down to the reserva-
tion. The Indians through the United States sought injunctive relief.
The lower federal courts granted the injunctive relief injoining inter-
273. The recent activity in requests for water permits from the North Dakota State
Water Commission for just such uses attest to this fact.
274. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
275. No North Dakota cases involving fishing rights have been uncovered. See 48 N.D.L.
REv. 734-35 (1972).
276. Alaska, Oregon, and Washington have highly developed commercial fishing interests
in which Indian tribes can and do participate. Minnesota also recognizes commercial fishing
rights in Red Lake by the Red Lake Chippewa tribe.
277. 198 U.S. 811 (1905). For a general discussion of Indian water rights law see Clyde,
Indian Water Rights, in 2 WAERS AND WATER RIGHTS 373 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
278. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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ference with reservation "use of 5,000 inches of the waters of Milk
River" in Montana.279
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances there
was an implied reservation of water rights by the Indians when
they ceded the larger area of the reservation to the United States
since to hold otherwise would have so greatly reduced the value
of the land for any retained purpose that it would be highly unlikely
that such a result could have been contemplated. The Court reasoned
that in order to become a "pastoral and civilized" people, the In-
dians could not have intended to grant to others the water that
is so necessary for agriculture in the arid western states. "[A]m-
biguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the
Indians.'
28 0
Several circumstances of the case should be noted. First, the
underlying theory is one of reservation of water rights by the In-
dians, not one of grant by the United States. How did the Indians
come to have water rights to be reserved in the first place? Second,
the Milk River is non-navigable. To what extent may Indian water
rights exist in navigable bodies of water? Third, is any more than
a prior existing use protected? Fourth, are the uses limited to
hunting and fishing, domestic, and agricultural uses? Fifth, the Court
noted that "there are springs and streams on the reservation flowing
about 2,900 inches of water." 281 Is there any question about the
Indian right to tap bodies of water confined wholly within the reser-
vation? Sixth, this case involved the interpretation of an agreement
establishing the reservation. Do the principles attach to reserva-
tions created by other means?
As to whether the admission of Montana as a state divested
the Indian rights, the Court held that the federal government had
the power to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropri-
ation under state laws.
2 2
In Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 22 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals faced squarely the issue whether future tribal
needs must be met in addition, to needs existing at the creation
of the reservation. The decision came shortly after the Winters
decision:
[The policy of the government to reserve whatever water
... may be reasonably necessary, not only for present uses,
279. Wintert v. United States, 143 F. 740, 148 F. 684 (9th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 207 U.S. 564
(1908).
280. 207 U.S. at 576.
281. Id.
282. The Court relied on United States v. Rio Grande Ditch & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899) ; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
283. 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
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but for future requirements, is clearly within the terms of





In this case the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from
obstructing the flow in the non-navigable Birch Creek in Montana
so as not to interfere with Indian rights on the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation. The district court allowed the Indians 1,666-2/3 inches
or 33-1/3 second feet: But this, said the circuit court, is subject
to modification "should the conditions on the reservation at any
time require such modification. ' 215 The court in referring to uses
said that the Tribe has "the paramount right" to use "to the extent
reasonably necessary for the purposes of irrigation and stock raising,
and domestic and other useful purposes,"28 although the focus of
this case clearly was agricultural.
In 1939 the Ninth Circuit again had occasion to consider Indian
water rights. In United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist.,,2 17 an ac-
tion was brought to enjoin defendants from interfering with the
flow in the Walker River, a non-navigable stream in Nevada so
as to preserve the flow to the Walker River Indian Reservation.
Rather than having been established by treaty or agreement, this
reservation was established by Executive action in November of
1859. The court found the absence of aboriginal ri'ghts insignificant:
"It would be irrational to assume that the intent was merely to
set aside the arid soil without reserving the means of rendering
it productive." 28 8 In other words, the same line of reasoning would
apply even though no treaty was involved. In response to the argu-
ment that establishment of water use rights should be based on
first come, first served, the court noted that it was understood
the Indians would make slow progress and would, therefore, be
at a competitive disadvantage. What amount did the Indians obtain?
It was "to the extent reasonably necessary to supply the needs
of the Indians," and "the area of irrigable land ... is not necessarily
the criterion for measuring the amount. 2 89 Only "experience" could
demonstrate the extent. The special master had determined that
26.25 second feet was demonstrated by seventy years experience.
The Indians are awarded this amount "during the irrigation season
of one hundred and eight days for the irrigation of two thousand
one hundred acres . . .and the flow of water reasonably necessary
for domestic and stock watering purposes and for power purposes
284. Id. at 832.
285. Id. at 835.
286. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
287. 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
288. Id. at 339.
289. Id. at 339-40.
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to the extent now used by the government, during the nonirrigating
season, with a priority of Nove~mber 29, 1859."29)
In 1939 in United States v. Powers, 291 the Supreme Court held
that the 1868 treaty established water for equal benefit of all tribal
members, so when land allotments were made, a water right passed
appurtenant to the land. Such rights were owned then by the indivi-
dual allottees and their successors in title rather than by the Tribe.
Since North Dakota Reservations are checkboarded With privately
owned land, individual Indian land, and tribally owned land, prob-
lems may arise in determining the amount of water needed.
More recently in 1956, in United States v. Ahtanurn Irrigation
District, " 2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the need
to adjust the quantum of water necessary for an Indian tribe. The
Court said:
[T]he quantum is not measured by the use being made at
the time the treaty reservation was made. The reservation
was not merely for present but for future use. Any other
construction of the rule in the Winters case would be wholly
unreasonable .. .298
It then went on to say that the waters were set aside for the
Indians regardless of the quantity remaining for white settlers. These
rights, having been reserved by treaty, are not subject to appropri-
ation under state law. The case involved Ahtanum Creek, a non-
navigable stream, and the Yakima Tribe in Washington. The Treaty
entered into in June of 1855 was similar to that involved in Winters.
One difference was that the Winters treaty referred to the center
of the Milk River while this treaty referred to the stream as the
boundary. The Court found no significance in this. The focus again
was on the agricultural use of the land. A question arose as to
a 1908 agreement by the Secretary of the Interior to the effect
that non-Indian users could have 75 per cent of the water while
the Indians would retain 25 per cent. "[W]e can readily perceive
that the Secretary of the Interior . . . improvidently bargained
away extremely valuable rights belonging to the Indians,' ' 294 but
it was not ultra vires. However, the 75 per cent is limited to the
1908 needs.
To that extent, then, Conrad and Ahtanurn provide a basis for
arguing that Indian usage of reserved waters is subject to change
to meet future needs. An important aspect of this concerns the na-
290. Id. at 340.
291. 305 U.S. 527 (1938).
292. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
293. 236 F.2d at 326.
294. Id. at 337.
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ture of those needs. In the Winters case the main concern of the
Court was with ensuring that the tribe was supplied with sufficient
water to meet its agricultural needs. With the advances in industrial
technology and decline dn the number of persons engaged in agri-
culture since 1908 it is not inconceivable that an Indian tribe would
consider applying its water resources to other than an agricultural
use. Indian tribes are considering putting water to recreational, tim-
bering, industrial and hydroelectric uses. 295 The possibility of the
Indian tribes being able to enforce claims to water for such uses
could have serious consequences for other appropriators who might
find themselves faced with a loss of water.
The Conrad case addressed the issue of uses by the Indians.
The court referred to Indian paramount rights in water as includ-
ing such things as irrigation, stock raising, domestic use, "and other
useful purposes. 2 9 6 The language here seems to indicate that irri-
gation was not the sole purpose for which reservation tribes could
use water. It might even seem reasonable to argue, based on this
language in Conrad, that changes in technology require the Indian
-tribes to use water for purposes other than agriculture in order to
keep their economy in step with the times.
Are the Indian water rights absolute or merely usufructuary
rights which, if not exercised by the Indian tribes, allow the water
to be used by other appropriators? In Ahtanum the court said that
an Indian water right was only a right to use the water, and if
the right was not exercised, the water could be used by anyone
else..'
In one sense the Ahtanum view clashes with the thrust of the
earlier cases. If the Courts hold that unused water rights are aban-
doned or lose priority to other appropriators, then the' Indian tribes
would stand little or no chance of recovering any Winters doctrine
rights that were reserved for their benefit. On .the other hand, if the
tribal claims are to be extended to unlimited usage with future needs
to be fulfilled by withdrawing waters from other appropriators, an
extremely unstable economic condition would exist. This condition
would most likely result in lack of full development of water re-
sources.
In North Dakota both the Fort Berthold Reservation and the
Standing Rock Reservation border or encompass sections of the
Missouri River. In the Winters case the issue of navigability of
the water was not raised, although the stream there involved was
295. Memo C2-2, presented to a Special Meeting of the Yellowstone Compact Commission
at Sheridan, Wyoming, May 6, 1971.
296. Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908).
297. United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 988 (1957). See Memo. auvra note 295.
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non-navigable. Since the Missouri River is navigable, the question
of a specific reservation of the waters becomes important. Gener-
ally, it may be argued, if navigable waters have not been reserved,
a tribe would have only the right of use of the water in common
with the citizens of the state. 2 8 Questions of intent and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of the Reservations would
be important in determining any claims by North Dakota Indian
Tribes to have prior and superior rights to use of waters in the
Missouri River.
2 99
Thus, for numerous reasons an approach that determines fin-
ally the needs of the Indian tribes and the future availability of
water resources to others is needed. Arizona v. California 30 0 may
provide the answer. There the Court held that Indian water
rights could be quantified by allowing the Indians enough water to
take care of the acreage pratically irrigable on their reservation.
This decision -would settle the question once the acreage can be de-
termined, if agricultural usage is the only use claimed for the water.
Some attorneys contend that Indian rights to water extend to con-
trol as well as to use. If this contention is correct, it may have ser-
ious implications for industrial appropriators on the Missouri River.
These same attorneys also contend that Indian water rights extend
to industrial and hydroelectric purposes. If these contentions are
correct also, quantification of water rights based on irrigable acre-
age might not only be irrelevant to the actual use made of the
water, but might also be based on highly unrealistic appraisals of
the quantity needed, resulting in prejudice to either the Tribe or other
appropriators.
A statement by one of the field solicitors of the Yellowstone
Compact Commission contends that since the reservations were
originally created for agricultural purposes, the water rights should
be limited to agriculture. 301 This argument overlooks the fact that
many of the "agricultural" lands reserved to the Indians were hardly
fit for agriculture. If the Indians can establish water rights in the
Missouri River, this resource may be worth as much or more than
the agricultural potential of reservation lands. It is a gross under-
statement to say that there is potential for much litigation in this
area.
The cases to date establish an Indian priority date as of the estab-
lishment of the reservation.302 They have not undertaken a thorough
review of aboriginal claims.
298. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 318 (1942).
299. Mr. Hart's interviews with B.I.A. engineers at New Town and Fort Yates Indicate
that data concerning use of the Missouri River by the tribes may not be very accurate.
300. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
801. Memo, 8upra note 295.
802. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); United States v. Ilibner, 27 F.2d
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The final aspect of Indian water rights to be discussed relates
to the source of the Indian water supply. From the cases previously
discussed or referred to, it seems clear that Indian use privileges
extend to navigable and non-navigable waters, to streams flowing
through or by the reservation and even to streams not touching
the reservation. If more than one source is available and not all
sources are necessary to satisfy the Indian need which source will
it be. United States v. Wrightman denied to the Indians several
small springs located on the corner of the reservation because "the
use of these waters is in no just sense necessary to the objects
for which the reservation was erected." 808
That Indian usage can extend to groundwater seems obvious.
The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior has ruled that since
state law cannot be applied to Indians on reservations in the absence
of specific congressional consent, in the absence of such consent
state groundwater law cannot be applied even though the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the Indian tribe consent.3 0 4 However,
there may be limits to drilling of wells on reservation lands within
duly authorized irrigation project areas that also contain non-Indian
lands. 0 5
In North Dakota, wells are used extensively on all four Indian
reservations.s 6 The Turtle Mountain Reservation in particular
contains large aquifers that provide a substantial water source for
the reservation. Plans are underway to tap a large aquifer near
Belcourt to provide for the needs of that town.
The North Dakota State Water Commission records show al-
most no information about the types of use, sources of water used,
or the quantities used by North Dakota tribes. The BIA offices on
all four reservations indicate that there irs raw data available that
could be studied to better determine the extent of water used on
the reservations S0 7 No statistics are available from that raw data
now. The reservation wells are used mainly for domestic and stock-
watering purposes. The Standing Rock and Fort Berthold BIA
offices advise that there are diversions on the Missouri River for
agricultural puposes, but that they have no idea as to the quantity
'diverted.808 The present lack of communication and cooperation be-
tween the State Water Commission and the .Indian tribes in North
Dakota as to Indian water claims could lead to extensive litigation.
909 (D. Idaho 1928) Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
303. 230 F. 277, 282 (D. Ariz. 1916).
304. Applicability to Indian lands of Arizona Law Regulating Withdrawal of Ground
Water, 61 Interior Dec. 209 (1953).
805. See Indian Irrigation Wells on San Carloe Project Lands, 61 Interior Dec. 312 (1954).
306. The conclusion is based on Mr. Bart's conversations with various B.I.A. and Indian
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What then is required? As a first step an analysis must be made
of all treaties, legislative acts, and executive pronouncements re-
lating to Indian lands in North Dakota. Second, a detailed examina-
tion must be made of the nature and extent of historic water uses
by Indians within North Dakota. Third, knowledge must be acquired
of present uses of both surface and groundwaters on Indian lands.
Fourth, projections must be made for future water needs on the
reservations. If after this knowledge becomes available, difficulties
arise in terms of lack of water, appropriate steps will have to be
taken to settle the problems.
VI. INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE RIGHTS
Many of North Dakota's important streams are either inter-
national or interstate in character or both. Thus more than one sover-
eignty may have claims thereto. There are several approaches to
solving these claims that will have to be briefed. These include
treaties, interstate compacts, federal legislation, and court appor-
tionment.
A treaty between nations is the usual method for resolving a
dispute as to the distribution and use of waters which traverse the
lands of more than one country. Furthermore, disputes over the
use of such resources should be resolved by applying international
law, which includes generally accepted principles limiting national
Sovereignty, as well as the application of treaty provisions. 0 9
The federal government has power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations. 310 This same power is denied to the states. 11 The
treaty power thus gives the federal government the power to regu-
late streams common to more than one nation. North Dakota's concern
is with Canada. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United
States and Canada3 1 2 is applicable to the Mouse, Pembina, and Red
Rivers in North Dakota. Article II of this treaty states that each
country shall have the "exclusive jurisdiction and control over the
use and diversion, . . . of all waters on its own side of the line . . .
which flow across the boundary or into boundary waters."31 3 There
is a restriction on this sovereignty, however, to the extent that "any
interference with or diversion . . . of such waters . . . resulting in
any injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the
same rights and entitle the injuried parties to the same legal remedies
309. For a thorough discussion of the general principles here involved see A. Utton,
International Streams and Lakes, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 401 (R. Clark ed. 1967),
which includes a separate section on "Canadian International Waters" at 430-69.
310. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. VI, cl. 2.
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
312. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2449 (1909).
318. Id.
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as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or
interference occurs. ' '314 This stipulation does not guarantee a re-
medy, however. It only places the downstream user in the same
position as one damaged at the point of diversion. Thus, if the
doctrine of sovereign immunity would apply against a user in the
country where the diversion took place, the downstream user in the
foreign country would also be without remedy.3 15
In 1962 the International Joint Commission was asked by the
governments of Canada and the United States to investigate and
report on the water resources in Manitoba and North Dakota. This
request concerned primarily the Pembina River, but resulted from
a 1948 reference by the Joint Commission to study water uses in
the Mouse and Red River basins.816 However, data concerning the
international aspects of the Souris and Red Rivers are scarce.
3 1 7
This final portion of the article will discuss briefly interstate
interests in water considering the use of interstate compacts, federal
legislation, and the doctrine of equitable apportionment as methods
to resolve interstate disputes over waters.
3 1 8
The interstate compact is a device that was contemplated when
the Constitution was drafted.3 19 Its popularity has increased in the
last thirty or forty years. The difficulty with an interstate compact
is that it fixes the rights of the states irrevocably until changed by
Congress or by mutual agreement of the states themselves, which
in some cases might prove to be a difficult task. The State of North
Dakota is involved in one interstate compact at present. This is the
Yellowstone River Compact, the signatories of which are North
Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana.32 0 The interests granted to North
Dakota under this compact are minimal, as there is little of the
Yellowstone that actually flows in North Dakota. However, the com-
pact does recognize that waters of tributary streams of the Yellow-
stone which have their origin in North Dakota and are situated entire-
ly in North Dakota and which flow into the Yellowstone River below
Intake, Montana, are to be alloted to North Dakota.3 21 When disputes
arise over these waters, the applicable provisions of the compact
will govern.
In disputes over interstate waters where no interstate compact
is in existence, two remedies may be applied by the federal govern-
314. Id.
315. A. Utton, supra note 309, at 441.
316. Waite, International Law Affecting Water Rights in the Western States, 4 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 67, 79 n.50 (1969).
317. Cf. Souris-Red-Rainy River Basins Comprehensive Study (1972).
318. For a thorough discussion of the general concepts here involved see C. Corker,
Water Rights in Interstate Streams, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs 293 (R. Clark ed.
1967).
319. Id. at 297.
320. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-23 (1960).
821. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-23-01, art. v. (1960).
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ment. The first remedy is by Congressional allocation of the waters.
The second remedy is by decision of the United States Supreme
Court.
Doubt as to the constitutionality of congressional apportionment
legislation was not resolved by the United States Supreme Court
until Arizona v. California3 22 in 1963, so this remedy has been little
used.
Resolution by decision of the United States Supreme Court through
the equitable apportionment doctrine has been limited in use gener-
ally to cases of direct conflict, between states.8 23 However, in the
justiciable cases between states the Court has made significant
decisions that result in a "federal common law" doctrine of equitable
apportionment. The doctrine attempts to divide the waters of inter-
state rivers in an equitable manner, depending in part upon the
water law applicable in the states involved. With the exception of
Minnesota, which is a riparian doctrine state, all of the states that
border North Dakota are prior appropriation doctrine states. In
this situation, the Court would give substantial weight to the under-
lying bases of prior appropriation doctrine. The principal case is
Nebraska v. Wyoming 32' decided in 1945. There the Court explained
its approach as follows:
. . . [W]e are confronted with the problem of equitable
apportionment. The Special Master recommended a decree
based on that principle. That was indeed the principle
adopted by the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado . . . . Since
Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska are appropriation States,
that principle would seem to be equally applicable here.
That does not mean that there must be a literal applica-
tion of the priority rule. . . . For example, the economy
of a region may have been established on the basis of jun-
ior appropriations. So far as possible these established
uses should be protected. . . . Appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the con-
sumptive use of water in the several sections of the river,
the character and rate of return flows, the extent of estab-
lished uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage
to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to down-
stream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these
are all relevant factors. They are merely illustrative, not
an exhaustive catalogue.
8 2 5
322. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
323. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907), where the Court found "perceptible
injury to portions of the Arkansas Valley in Kansas . . . [but] yet to the great body of
the Valley it [Colorado's appropriation] has worked little, if any, detriment," so Kansas
was not entitled to a decree.
324. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
325. Id. at 617-18.
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Thus it is not certain that if North Dakota, for example, fails to
use the water flowing in the Missouri River, downstream states
that use it will obtain prior rights to continued flow and use. As
can be seen from the foregoing summary by the Court, prior use
is only one of many factors taken into account.
From the foregoing short summary in relation to international
and interstate rights it can be seen that there is no easy settlement
for apportionment difficulties that may arise, but that several forums
are available. At the present time there is no clear delineation as
to apportionment of any international or interstate body of water
for North Dakota. To more fully understand the applicability and
shortcomings of the various approaches available, a detailed study
should be undertaken of each.
VII. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The preceding sections of this article cover the gamut of pos-
sible ownership and control interests in the water within North Dak-
ota. At times no clear distinction is drawn between ownership and
control. However, the article does set forth the relevant arguments.
It shows that legal issues remain to be solved and that factual
analyses remain to be made as to whether certain legal principles
have any applicability.
The North Dakota Code provision which states that ownership
of the water within North Dakota is in the public can only be inter-
preted as follows: The people of North Dakota own the water within
the state of North Dakota; subject to existing riparian and prescrip-
tive rights; subject to existing unsufructuary rights obtained pur-
suant to the state's prior appropriation law, some through permit,
others through physical appropriation, and subject to the issuance
of further such permits and further physical appropriation; subject
to whatever ownership rights may exist in the federal government
and Indian Tribes, and subject certainly to a great degree of control
by the federal government over the use of water from federal struc-
tures and navigable waters; subject to whatever claims Canada
may have to international streams; and subject to whatever claims
other states may have to the interstate bodies of water. It will pro-
bably be a long time before some of the larger claims are settled.
Some claims could be settled through use of the adjudicatory mechan-
ism provided in the North Dakota Code.
The article has also pointed out problems within the scope
of each of the claims analyzed. For example, many questions re-
main as to the nature of the appropriative use right obtained
under the current North Dakota Code. Many of these questions
could be answered through rule-making by the State Engineer or
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the State Water Commission, and, if they fail to act, by the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly. Some of the problems seem to have
arisen because the North Dakota appropriation law had its begin-
nings in an Irrigation Code and it has now outgrown the limitation
to irrigation without all of the necessary language changes having
been made.
Hopefully, this article will spur clarification efforts.
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